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INTRODUCTION

Do "cultural factors" substantively influence the creation and evolution of
property institutions? For the past several decades, few legal scholars have
answered affirmatively. Those inclined towards a law and economics
methodology tend to see property institutions as the outcome of self-interested
and utilitarian bargaining and therefore often question the analytical usefulness
of "culture"-defined here as social norms, values, and beliefs that are
embraced and internalized without empirical discovery or analytical
justification -in understanding this process.2 The major emerging alternative,
t
Associate Professor, Yale Law School. Parts of this project were made possible by the
Prize Fellowship from the Yale East Asian Council. For comments and suggestions, I thank Ralf
Michaels, Jedediah Purdy, James Boyle, Barak Richman, Henry Smith, John Goldberg, Mark Ramseyer,
William Alford, and participants of workshops and panels at Duke University and Harvard University. I
also thank Zack Gong for research assistance. All mistakes are mine.
This definition of culture is drawn from Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the
I.
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a progressive literature that emphasizes the social embeddedness of both
property institutions and individuals, is in theory more accommodating of
cultural analysis3 but has thus far done very little of it. 4 In either case, the
notion that "culture" can significantly influence property use and regulation has
fallen by the wayside.
This Article develops a "cultural" theory of how property institutions are
created and seeks to demonstrate that such a theory is particularly powerfulperhaps indispensable-in explaining large-scale institutional differences
between societies. To this end, it argues that, in the two centuries before largescale industrialization, China, England, and Japan displayed systematic and
fundamental differences in their regulation of property use and transfer. It
further argues that these legal and institutional differences are best explained by
certain aspects of social culture, specifically by the criteria for sociopolitical
status distribution. Some of these criteria are distinctly "cultural" in the sense
that utilitarian, self-interested bargaining alone could not plausibly have created
them. Instead, they were probably generated, in large part, by the widespread
social internalization of moral values.
These historical arguments pave the way for a broader theoretical claim:
"culture" is often a major determinant of property institutions, so much that we
can actually identify societal "cultural paradigms" in property institutions. Even
if we assume, as conventional law and economics urges, that individuals
generally approach property use, alienation, and regulation through a selfinterested and utilitarian mindset,5 their pursuit of perceived personal utility is

Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection of Collectivist and Individualist
Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
RationalActors: A Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).
2.
See literature reviews at, for example, Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law Contested
Terrain: A Law and Society Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 L. & SOC'Y REV. 181 (2004); Jack
Knight & Lee Epstein, Building the Bridgefrom Both Sides of the River: Law and Society and Rational
Choice, 38 L. & SOC'Y REV. 207 (2004); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasionand
History, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 157, 158 (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 542 (1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The
Prospectsfor an InterdisciplinaryDiscourse on Law, 1997 WiSC. L. REV. 389, 399, 400-02 (1997);
Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & SoC'Y. 50 (1995); and JOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 251-52 (1995). See also Yunchien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Structure and Style in Comparative Property Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (Giovanni B. Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg eds.,
forthcoming), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2373377 (arguing for a functionalist
theory of comparative property law); Robert C. Ellickson, The Twilight of Critical Theory: A Reply to
Litowitz, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 333 (2003) (criticizing certain cultural theories of property); Thomas
E. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the

Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875 (2003) (arguing for "scientific" theories of law that parallel
economics).
3.
A brief summary of progressive property's core arguments is provided by Hanoch Dagan,
Property s Structural Pluralism: On Autonomy, the Rule of Law, and the Role of Blackstonian
Ownership, in 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. (2014); and Gregory S. Alexander et al., A
Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009). The literature is surveyed at
Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property,80 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2011).
4.
There are exceptions. E.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006); Anna di

Robilant, Property:Bundle ofSticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869 (2013).
5.
See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY, ch. 1 (2012) (summarizing utilitarian property theory); Thomas W. Merrill,
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nonetheless constrained or empowered by social norms of status distribution
that determine their relative bargaining power. In fact, precisely because we
assume that most people prefer property norms that advance their perceived
self-interest, we also need to explain what happens when there is fundamental
conflict between individual interests, and here cultural internalization is more
critical than property scholars have commonly acknowledged.
The Article first presents a straightforward social choice theory of
property norm bargaining: the higher someone's social and political status, the
more capable they are of advancing their own norm preferences over the
competing preferences of others. A society in which, for example, large
landholders monopolize social and political positions of high status and
prestige will have far more "rich-friendly" property norms than a society in
which such positions are distributed somewhat equally between the rich and
poor.
Building on this basic observation, the Article then argues that different
societies often have fundamentally different "status distribution criteria"-that
is, the social norms that determine how individuals obtain social and political
status: some societies rank individuals primarily by wealth, whereas others rank
by electoral or social popularity, by academic achievement, by age and
generational seniority, by hereditary bloodlines, or by caste systems.7 What
status distribution criteria a society abides by has enormous consequences for
the power balance between its various social groups and classes and therefore
great impact on its choice of property norms.
What distinguishes this Article from other theories of property norm
formation is, ultimately, its insistence that these "status distribution norms" are
often cultural. It argues that purely utilitarian or functionalist theories of norm
formation often fail to explain why different societies tend to adopt different
status distribution norms. Instead, these differences are best explained by
differences in social culture-social values that are systematically embraced
and internalized, perhaps "taken for granted," by large segments of the society
as innately "right" and "moral," and are not regularly re-justified or reexamined
based on their material consequences. Some status distribution norms can, in
fact, enjoy long-term popularity despite having strongly negative material
consequences, whether for society as a whole or for many prominent
individuals. Their longevity is understandable only if we accept that individuals
can morally internalize certain status distribution norms that actually damage

Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 151, 152 (2012); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007);
Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001); Christine Jolls,
Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476-80 (1997) (discussing bounded self-interest).
6.
This is something that mainstream property theory tends to overlook. See Katrina M.
Wyman, From Fur to Fish. Reconsideringthe Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117

(2005).
7.
See Xiaotian Zhang, Status Inconsistency Revisited: An Improved Statistical Model, 24
EURO. Soc. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (noting the complex factors that affect the calculation of social
status).
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their material self-interest.8
There is, therefore, a chain of causation from these cultural norms of
status distribution to the power balance between different social classes, to the
shape and substance of property institutions. In other words, property
institutions can be determined by certain aspects of social culture. Should we
ignore these cultural undertones, we risk confining ourselves to an incomplete
understanding of how property institutions are created. In particular, we will
struggle to explain why different societies have historically differed
dramatically in some of their most important property institutions.
To illustrate this, this Article focuses on three major Western European
and East Asian economies in the two centuries immediately before large-scale
industrialization. It specifically examines how-and, more importantly, whythe property institutions that governed land mortgages differed from country to
country. These were, in fact, some of the most economically significant norms
in any preindustrial economy: short of selling land outright, mortgaging land
was often the only way for the average landholder to obtain large sums of cash,
something that became increasingly important with rapid commercialization.
Creditors, on the other hand, relied heavily on mortgage default and the seizure
of collateral to accumulate landed wealth. Given the very high stakes involved,
debtors and creditors clashed fiercely over the legal and customary rules that
governed
these
transactions:
should
they
enforce
mandatory
redemption/repayment deadlines? If so, where should they set the deadline?
What rights should they grant the creditor in case of default?
The battle lines were similarly drawn in all three countries: the
stereotypical land mortgagor everywhere was a cash-strapped smallholder who
borrowed money from a richer neighbor and who almost always preferred
property norms that allowed him a longer period to redeem his mortgaged
land.' 0 In comparison, larger, wealthier landholders generally played the role
of creditor and therefore fought hard to impose tight customary limits on
redemption and harsh consequences on defaulters. The economic rationales
underlying these entrenched positions were complex but fairly universal:
essentially, land was so valuable in all these preindustrial agrarian economies
that debtors desperately wanted to maximize their odds of redeeming the
collateral, while creditors were no less eager to minimize those odds and
8.
Such acceptance is extremely commonplace in anthropological or sociological studies, see,
e.g., LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER (Sally F. Moore ed., 2005), and in the work of some
political scientists, see, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, ROBERT LEONARDI & RAFAELLA NANETrI, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993) (discussing the importance of civic
culture to democratic governance). It is only in certain fields-microeconomics and political economy
are the major ones-that this needs to be "proven," rather than simply assumed. Property theory is,
however, one of these, given its strongly law and economics-oriented methodology.
9.
Early modem mortgages, whether English, Chinese, or Japanese, generally gave the
creditor a right of occupation and use over the collateral-in some cases, formal title-prior to full
repayment, and therefore repayment was the same thing as redemption of the collateral. See discussion
at infra Part III.A. The modem Anglo-American distinction between timely "repayment" and
"redemption" during foreclosure only exists because of the rise of lien mortgages, in which the creditor
has no property right prior to default and foreclosure. See DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 7, 261-63 (2004).
10. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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maximize their own odds of seizing the collateral upon default.I
Although the negotiation of mortgage norms tended to be a rich-versuspoor process almost everywhere, the actual laws and customs that emerged
from this process were profoundly different from country to country: English
norms were strongly pro-creditor and pro-rich, imposing extremely short
deadlines on mortgage redemption and allowing creditors to permanently seize
collateral immediately upon default. Chinese norms were almost unreasonably
pro-debtor and pro-smallholder, allowing debtors to retain valid redemption
rights for eternity-at virtually no interest-and therefore almost never risk
permanent loss of the collateral. In-between these two extremes, Japanese
norms resembled the English framework but usually gave debtors a longer
period to repay. 12 Correspondingly, both early modem England and Japan
underwent periods of massive land concentration and growing inequality, with
the English process being especially rapid and ruthless.' 3 China, however,
experienced minimal land concentration in its pre-industrial history.14
Why were Chinese smallholders so much more successful than their
English and Japanese peers in securing favorable property rules, and why were
English smallholders particularly unsuccessful? The historical evidence
strongly suggests that these divergent outcomes had roots in the different
sociopolitical status and power of smallholders in these societies: Chinese
smallholders regularly occupied positions of high political authority in local
communities, and therefore had the sociopolitical clout to win important
property norm concessions from wealthier households.' 5 In comparison, large
landholders enjoyed a virtual monopoly on high sociopolitical status in rural
England and were therefore able to push through legal changes that aided their
accumulation of land. Japanese local politics was likewise dominated by the
rich, but not quite to the same extent.' 7
Up to this point, the historical account is completely compatible with
conventional political economy theories of property norm formation:
individuals tend to support norms that serve their economic self-interest, and
those with higher sociopolitical status tend to get the norms they want. The
account begins to diverge from utilitarian assumptions about social behavior,
however, when we consider how high status individuals obtained that status in
11.
12.

Id.
See discussion infra Part III.A.

See discussion surrounding infra note 144.
13.
See discussion surrounding infra note 166.
14.
See discussion infra Part IV.A. For a more detailed treatment, see Taisu Zhang, Social
15.
Hierarchiesand the Formationof Customary Property Law in Pre-Industrial China and England, 62

AM. J. COMP. L. 171 (2014).
See KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580-1680, at 43 (2003); H.R. French, Social
16.
Status, Localism and the 'Middle Sort of People' in England, 1620-1750, 166 PAST & PRESENT 66, 74

(2000).
17.
See discussion infra Part IV.A. Detailed studies on Tokugawa social hierarchies include
EDWARD E. PRATT, JAPAN'S PROTOINDUSTRIAL ELITE: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE GONo
(1999); HERMAN OoMS, TOKUGAWA VILLAGE PRACTICE: CLASS, STATUS, POWER, LAW (1996); KAREN
WIGEN, THE MAKING OF A JAPANESE PERIPHERY 1750-1920 (1995); THOMAS C. SMITH, THE
AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF MODERN JAPAN (1959); Brian W. Platt, Elegance, Prosperity, Crisis: Three
Generationsof Tokugawa Village Elites, 55 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 45 (2000).

352

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 41: 347

the first place. The divergence is primarily driven by the need to account for
both cross-country differences and intra-country homogeneity: one of the most
striking things about the comparisons drawn above is that they were truly
country-level differences. Within core Chinese macroregions, there was
remarkably little regional variation in either mortgage norms or rich-poor
power balances. The same can be said of Japan and England.
Country-level differences deserve country-level explanations. The
amount of ecological and economic diversity within each country, especially
China, makes it exceedingly difficult to explain intra-country homogeneity
without invoking some sort of country-level external influence. The usual
solution-centralized legislation and regulation by the state-is largely
inapplicable to these early modem societies, as they simply did not possess
governments powerful enough to dictate local property institutions or social
structures. Customs and social norms were the true sources of local property
regulation. 19 The question, therefore, is how decentralized self-governance
produced similar status distributions and property institutions across entire
countries.
Shared cultural values are likely the only plausible answer: there is much
evidence to suggest that the different power balances between rich and poor in
these countries was the systemic result of normative differences. Chinese
society broadly embraced the Neo-Confucian social ideal that individuals
should self-organize into large kinship networks and that social rank within
those networks should be determined by age and generational seniority. 20In
rural Japan, most communities believed that individuals drew their social status
from both the status of their ancestors and from their own wealth. 21 This
created a system that eventually converged on ranking by wealth, but with
some destitute households hanging onto high status-for a time-by virtue of
former wealth. Early modem English society, in comparison, tended to allocate
sociopolitical status based primarily on landed wealth, thereby excluding
virtually all smallholders from positions of social authority.22
Moreover, while it might be possible, if difficult, to argue that English or
Japanese "status distribution criteria" were simply the result of utility
maximization by local communities, it is almost certainly impossible to
construct such an argument for China.23 There are few utilitarian advantages to

18.
England began modern state-building considerably earlier than China or Japan. See HE
WENKAI, PATHS TOWARDS THE MODERN FISCAL STATE: ENGLAND, JAPAN, AND CHINA (2014). See
generally STEVEN PINCuS, 1688 THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION (2009) (describing England's
fifteenth century state-building).
19.
See discussion infra Part 1IlA. On the manipulation of formal law by Japanese villagers,
see OOMS, supra note 17, at 222-42; and J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE HISTORY 26
(1996). For a detailed treatment of how Qing law was generally overrode by local custom, see Taisu
Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial

China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 129, 168-74 (2011).
20.
21.

See discussion infra Part IV.A. For more detailed discussion, see Zhang, supra note 15.
See discussion infra Part IVA. For more detailed discussion, see sources cited supra note

22.
23.

WRIGHTSON, supra note 16; French, supra note 16.
See discussion at infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.

17.
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ranking by age and generational seniority, and almost certainly none that could
explain its dominance across such a vast and ecologically diverse country for at
least six centuries. It is far more likely-both more logically coherent and more
empirically documentable-that the near-universal embrace of Confucian
kinship hierarchies was driven by widespread value-internalization and moral
agreement.
There was, therefore, a chain of causation that linked distinctly cultural
norms of status distribution to power balances between the rich and poor, and
then to the creation of customary property institutions that reflected those
power balances. This allows us to speak of "cultural paradigms" in the property
institutions of these societies. We could ask, of course, why widespread moral
internalization of cultural values happened in the first place, but the "why"
questions must stop somewhere in this Article. Stopping at cultural values
emphasizes the qualitative difference between moral internalization on the one
hand, and, on the other, the utilitarian calculation of self-interest that property
scholars usually associate with property use and regulation.
Let me immediately acknowledge that there is perhaps nothing
theoretically incompatible between the kind of cultural narrative advocated
here and utilitarian assumptions of self-interested economic behavior: one
could argue, for example, that value internalization simply alters individual
utility functions, whereas microeconomic theory usually takes individual utility
24
functions as given, rather than something to be explained. Certainly, this
Article does not argue that utilitarian theories of property are wrong-it merely
argues that they are incomplete without serious analysis of cultural values. If
there are indeed paradigmatic, cultural differences in individual utility
functions that explain societal institutional divergence, then surely we cannot
be satisfied with a theory of property that simply takes those utility functions
for granted.
Another issue is whether we can take the cultural influence thesis even
further-to argue that the very notion of property is inherently cultural, that the
economic maximization of property is itself a cultural value, contingent upon
societal internalization and acceptance. The major obstacle is that, in matters of
basic economic production, land use, and even the negotiation of property
norms, people behaved similarly pragmatically in all countries studied here.
People in similar economic circumstances, whether English, Chinese, or
Japanese, tended to prefer similar property norms and were indeed similarly
vocal and aggressive about it.25 On the one hand, none of this disproves the,
all-economic-rationality-is-a-cultural-construct
crudely,
somewhat
put

Neoclassic versions of this assumption often assume utility functions to be not only
24.
exogenous, but also unchanging and universal. Cf Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of

Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988); George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non
Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977). But see David Krackhardt, Endogenous Preferences:
A Structural Approach, in DEBATING RATIONALITY: NON-RATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING 239 (Jennifer Halpern & Robert N. Stem eds., 1998); Robert A. Pollak, Habit
Formationand Dynamic Demand Functions, 78 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1970).
See discussion infra Part Ill.
25.
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argument.26 On the other hand, however, it also fails to contradict the view that
economic maximization of land resources is, essentially, human nature,
especially in agrarian economies where land is the most important source of
livelihood. Additional research may be capable of differentiating between these
two positions, but this Article cannot.
In other words, this Article attempts to establish a "lower bound" for the
cultural analysis of how property institutions are created: at a minimum,
cultural factors can significantly affect the creation of property institutions, and
therefore deserve to be taken more seriously. This may be underselling the
influence of cultural internalization over property institutions, but given how
little work has been done in this direction-and how openly skeptical some
leading scholars are of "culture" as an analytical unit27-it seems only prudent
to take it one step at a time.
The placement of the Article's historical narrative in pre-industrial
economies deserves some additional explanation. This is largely driven by
empirical concerns: once China began large-scale industrialization in the 1950s,
a number of factors emerged that make observation of cultural influences on
property institutions considerably more difficult. The Communist party-state
not only was vastly more powerful than its predecessors but also adhered to a
political ideology of substantial foreign origin.28 This makes it highly difficult
to distinguish transplanted ideas from indigenous ones, superficial institutions
from substantively effective ones, and utilitarian calculations from internalized
values. A somewhat similar transformation-expansion of state authority
coupled with elite embracement of foreign political ideologies-occurred in
Japan after the Meiji Revolution.29 Essentially, it is much easier to structurally
analyze pre-industrial East Asian societies than industrialized ones. Picking the
low-hanging empirical fruit first does not, however, necessarily damage the
theoretical claim the Article attempts to illustrate. Moreover, pre-industrial
societies are not necessarily pre-modem, especially when they are highly
commercialized, privatized, and populated by aggressively wealth-maximizing
individuals. 30

26.
For major works that have made this argument see, among others, MARCEL MAUss, THE
GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 2000) (1925);
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968); J.I. Prattis, Synthesis, or a
New Problematic in Economic Anthropology, II THEORY AND SOCIETY 205-28 (1982); and STEPHEN
GUDEMAN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ECONOMY COMMUNITY, MARKET, AND CULTURE (2001).
27.
E.g., RAMSEYER, supra note 20, at 7; Ellickson, supranote 2.
28.
Local histories that document the expansion of state power under the PRC include, for
example, EDWARD FRIEDMAN, PAUL G. PICKOWICZ & MARK SELDEN, CHINESE VILLAGE, SOCIALIST
STATE (1991); and ANITA CHAN, RICHARD MADSEN & JONATHAN UNGER, CHEN VILLAGE UNDER MAO
AND DENG: EXPANDED AND UPDATED EDITION (1992).
29.
DANIEL V. BOTSMAN, PUNISHMENT AND POWER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN
(2005); ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM TOKUGAWA TIMES TO THE PRESENT
61-77, 94-138 (2d ed. 2003); CONRAD TOTMAN, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 322-67 (2000).
30.
There have been endless debates on when China and Japan entered the "modem era," with
some placing the Chinese transition as early as the tenth century. See, e.g., VALERIE HANSEN, THE OPEN
EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF CHINA THROUGH 1600, at 3-14 (2000); Robert M. Hartwell, Demographic,
Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750-1550, 42 HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD. 365 (1982). On
Japan, see BOTSMAN, supra note 29; and Arland Thornton, The Developmental Paradigm, Reading
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A final word about terminology: as noted above, "culture," in this Article,
refers to social norms, values, and beliefs that are commonly embraced and
internalized without empirical discovery or analytical justification. This is the
definition most commonly adopted by law and economics scholars or
institutional economists, but is also substantially narrower than the
conventional definition in legal anthropology. There, as one prominent
anthropologist once put it, "culture is all," and encompasses "durable customs,
ideas, values, habits, and practices." 31 The problem with this more expansive
definition of "culture" is that it potentially incorporates many social phenomena
that are actually equilibrium outcomes of self-interested bargaining. Defining
"culture" as internalized norms and values does, at the very least, distinguish it
from conscious, utilitarian calculations of self-interest.
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part I discusses how
and why cultural analysis has been absent from modem theories of how
property institutions are created. Part II outlines a "cultural" theory that largely
complements, rather than contradicts, these preexisting schools of thought.
Parts III and IV then demonstrate its applicability to mortgage institutions in
pre-industrial China, Japan, and England. Part III argues that distributions of
sociopolitical status exerted tremendous influence over these mortgage
institutions. Part IV then identifies the specific social hierarchies that underlay
these status distribution patterns, and argues that some of them were the
product of cultural internalization. The Conclusion offers further theoretical
discussion and some preliminary thoughts on how the theoretical insights
developed here can be applied to contemporary societies.
A quick note on the ordering of Parts III and IV: as a matter of causation,
the material in Part IV precedes that in Part III, in that the "chain of causation"
I argue for runs from cultural norms to status distribution patterns to property
institutions. I have found, however, that it is generally easier to work
backwards-from the phenomenon back to the explanation-when arguing for
historical causation. Hence, I start with a description of mortgage institutions in
Part III, identify the status distribution patterns that underlay them, and then
work my way back to cultural norms in Part IV.
I.

A.

THE ABSENCE OF "CULTURE" IN PROPERTY THEORY

"Culture" in Economic Theories ofProperty

As more than one scholar has observed, contemporary property theory is
dominated by law and economics.32 None of the field's major debates in recent
decades, including its close involvement in the law and social norms literature
during the 1990s and early 2000s and the ongoing debate over the divisibility
of property,33 have unfolded without heavy, and in some cases near-exclusive,
HistorySideways, and Family Change, 38 DEMOGRAPHY 449 (2001).
31.
Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology,
1949-1999, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 346, 347, supra note 8.
32.
ALEXANDER & PENALVER, supranote 5.
33.
For surveys of the social norms literature, see Ellickson, supra note 2; Etzioni, supra note
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reliance on economic analysis. This is especially true of those parts of the field
that study the creation and evolution of property institutions. Most theories on
this issue are constructed upon the basic behavioral assumption that individuals
seek to maximize some unitary measure of personal utility, often assumed to
correlate closely with wealth. 34 This self-interested mindset then determines
both their reaction to preexisting property institutions and, when given the
ability to change or create such institutions, their preferences and bargaining
strategy. In particular, people will support those property institutions that they
believe will generate the most expected personal utility.
This Section argues that "culture," defined here as internalized social
values, has been largely invisible in the economic analysis of how property
institutions are created and that this absence is very likely due to the strong
methodological individualism of mainstream economic analysis. To make this
argument, it is helpful to first look beyond property theory per se, towards
broader, more abstract, discussions and surveys of law and economics
methodology. It is primarily in this latter category that scholars have explicitly
considered-and sometimes expressly rejected-the analytical potential of
cultural internalization.
At a 1989 symposium on "Post-Chicago Law and Economics," Robert
Ellickson suggested two ways in which law and economics might move beyond
the strict rational actor model that, at the time, dominated the field.35
Discussing the field in general, but with a constant eye towards property theory,
Ellickson outlined both a "psychological" approach and a "sociological"
approach. The former would introduce "innate" cognitive biases into models of
economic and legal behavior, whereas the latter would examine how "social
forces influence human behavior," particularly how they "may shape a person's
internal tastes for particular outcomes." 36 These forces are also referred to as
"culture" and the process by which they influence individual preferences as
"the internalization of culture." 37 Looking forward, Ellickson argued that
scholarship based only on rational actor models would face "diminishing
returns" and that scholars should "investigate . . . two notions: the frailty of
human cognition and the possibility of a self-enforced altruism arising from the
influence of culture."3 8
The primary difference between Ellickson's "psychological" and
"sociological" approaches appears to be the difference between universal,

2; and Richard H. McAdams, Comment, Accountingfor Norms, 1997 Wisc. L. REV. 625. For surveys of
the ongoing debate over the "bundle of rights" metaphor, see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CAL. L. REv. 107, 145-66 (2013) (surveying
progressive ideas on the structure of property rights); Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A
Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193 (2011); and Eric R.
Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic Scholarship, 8 ECON J. WATCH 205 (2011)
(surveying the law and economics branch of this debate).
34. See sources cited supra note 5.
35. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critiqueof Classical Law andEconomics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 55.
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innate behavioral tendencies and highly localized cultural norms that must be
learned and digested. We would not expect English communities to share the
same cultural norms as Korean ones, but we might expect that both display risk
aversion, endowment effects, and framing effects. There is, of course, room for
overlap and interaction between the two approaches, as evidenced by the
growing body of scholarship on "cultural cognition," which examines how
certain cognitive biases, such as framing effects, reinforce cultural differences
between social groups.39
In retrospect, Ellickson's prescriptions appear to have been, more or less,
half-embraced. Since the early 1990s, cognitive psychology and behavioral
economics has indeed come to assume a commanding position within law and
economics, to the point where scholars could begin talking about "what comes
after victory for behavioral law and economics." 40 The second prong-that law
and economics also investigate "the influence of culture"-has, however, met
with a much more muted response. A number of more recent field surveys have
noted that sociological approaches to legal scholarship remained "largely
unexplored" in general, and had virtually no import on law and economics in,
particular.4 1
Theories of how property institutions are created and evolve prove no
exception to these general observations. They have encompassed a tremendous
variety of topics in recent years-covering the spectrum from social norms to
formal laws and regulations, from the "core" characteristics of property to
specific rules regulating use and alienation-but have generally done so
without employing what Ellickson would recognize as sociological methods or
cultural theories of human behavior. A major recent article by Henry Smith
argues, for example, that "both the mind and the law can be regarded as
information-processing devices that manage complexity and economize on.
information by employing concepts and rules, the specific-over-general
principle, modularity, and recursiveness." 42 This leads Smith to argue
elsewhere that different legal systems tend to produce functionally similar
property institutions because, at some fundamental level, they are all designed
to help individuals manage and reduce the information costs inherent in
property use and transaction.4 3 Lee Anne Fennell likewise acknowledges that,

Yale
Law
School,
Project
at
Cultural
Cognition
generally The
39.
See
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011
40.
U. ILL. L. REV. 1653. Studies on how cognitive biases influence the creation of property norms include,
for example, Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PAPA. L. REV. 2097

(2012); Russel Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003);
and Lee A. Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008). See also Eric A. Kades, A
Positive Theory ofEminent Domain (William & Mary Law Sch., Working Paper, No. 08-08, 2008).
41.
Edelman, supra note 2, at 182. A similar observation is found in Robert Cooter, Law and
Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y. 50 (1995). A recent attempt by Menachem Mautner to
systematically survey works on "law and culture" reveals quite a bit of work done by scholars trained in
sociological or anthropological methods, but hardly any that incorporates significant amounts of
economic analysis. Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV.

839 (2011).
42.
43.

Smith, supra note 40.
Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis ofCivil Versus Common Law

358

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 41: 347

in her view, "property's core debates" generally "boil down ... to a question of
production functions and nonlinearities" 44 and that property norms are
therefore created and transformed in response to objective economic
necessities. In both articles, the driving force behind the creation of property
rights-information costs inherent in property use or the nonlinearity of
production functions-exists largely independently of sociocultural context.
Other works explain the creation of property institutions through models
or narratives that make no mention of "cultural factors" but are also not
categorically incompatible with their existence. For example, in a 2009 article
on the origins of property rights, James Krier considers two different but
somewhat overlapping models of -human behavior: a "biological model" in
which human preferences on property rights are "product[s] of biological
evolution" -and
therefore "genetically predetermined" " for any given
individual; and a "human model" in which individuals consciously choose how
to behave based on personal cost-benefit analysis but nonetheless have some
"innate sense of possession and territory.'"4 7 Although value internalization is
never mentioned in either model, it could conceivably play some role, at least,
in shaping the personal preferences that shape cost-benefit analysis. The same
is true of Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky's recent attempts to
construct a "unified theory of property," in which property norms are primarily
designed to "defend the value"-defined here as social welfare or utility-"in
stable ownership." 48 There is, logically, the possibility that individual
compositions of value or utility could vary depending on sociocultural context,
but the authors do not pursue this line of inquiry.
If we turn our attention away from these "core debates" over the nature
and origin of property, and towards the economic analysis of how specific rules
and norms are created, "the influence of culture" is similarly indiscernible.
Recent articles that seek to explain, for example, zoning laws, land
demarcations, probate reforms, or the rule against perpetuities all adhere to
traditional assumptions about individual economic and political rationality and,
perhaps correspondingly, pay very little attention to the possibility of value
internalization. 49
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2012).
44. Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1984 (2012).
45. James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 139, 152 (2009).
46. Id. at 154.
47. Id. at 155 (quoting ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, Co-OPERATION and
Welfare 107 (1986)).
48.
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 531 (2005).
49.
See, e.g., Vicki Been et al., Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the
Growth Machine?, I1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111

COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2011); Gary D. Libecap, Dean Lueck & Trevor O'Grady, Large Scale
Institutional Changes: Land Demarcation in the British Empire, 54 J.L. & ECON. 295 (2011); David
Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013); James R. Hines Jr., Rational Choice and the

Rule Against Perpetuities (Univ. Mich. L. Sch., Working Paper, 2015); James R. Hines Jr., Workshop
Presentation at University of Chicago Law School: Rational Intestacy and Probate Reform (Feb. 2013);
Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetitionfor Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005). In fact, if one were to comb through all
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What explains this general reluctance to engage in sociocultural analysis?
Ellickson himself offers perhaps the best explanation: writing in 1998 on the
"discovery" of social norms by the legal academy, Ellickson appeared to
reconsider his earlier willingness to incorporate sociological methods.50 He put
forth a brief but compelling explanation for why sociological methods had
been, and would probably continue to be, unappealing to law and economics:
sociologists were "unable to coalesce around a dominant paradigm" of human
behavior.5 ' More importantly, their tendency to see "informal groups and
cultures as operative engines .

.

. bewilders economists and other devotees of

methodological individualism." 52 In other words, sociologists all too often
failed to explain the individual incentives and decisions behind group activity
or norm creation, instead choosing to present them "as is"-and this was, in
Ellickson's view, incompatible with the economist's need to explain economic
or social phenomenon as the aggregate of logically coherent individual
behavior models. In many ways, this may also explain why law and economics
scholars have been far more accepting of cognitive science: despite their many
challenges to rational actor models, behavioral biases manifest as innate
individual biases, which can then be aggregated onto the group level. In
comparison, treating "groups" or "cultures" as "operative engines" may feel
insufficiently rigorous or coherent, even lazy.
But while legal scholars have generally declined to introduce cultural
factors into the economic analysis of property institutions-or perhaps into law
and economics in general-if we look beyond the confines of the legal
academy, there have actually been some very serious, if ultimately problematic,
attempts at incorporating "culture" into institutional economics. In fact, several
pioneers of the New Institutional Economics, including Harold Demsetz,
Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson, were open to the possibility that
cultural factors could significantly influence the creation and evolution of
political and legal institutions, including, and perhaps especially, property
institutions. Demsetz, in his seminal article on the origin of property norms,
hypothesized that property institutions could depend very much on a
"community's taste" for collectivism. 53 North and Williamson both
acknowledge the potential existence of "Level 1" "norms, customs, mores,
54
traditions, etc." that are socially embedded and change extremely slowly.
These "Level 1" norms then affect the formation of lower level institutionsthe property law-focused papers presented at the past twelve American Law and Economics Association
annual meetings, one would be hard pressed to find any paper that seriously engages with the notion of
internalized cultural values and mores. See Annual Meeting, AM. L. & ECON. Ass'N, http://www
.amlecon.org/alea-meeting.htmi (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
50.
See Ellickson, Law andEconomics Discovers Social Norms, supra note 2.

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 542.
Id.
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).

Note that this does not necessarily amount to a substantive account of how property rights are created.
Instead, Demsetz is simply discussing a few hypothetical possibilities. See Richard A. Posner, Some

Uses andAbuses ofEconomics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 289 (1979) (discussing Demsetz).
Oliver E. Williamson, The New InstitutionalEconomics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38
54.
J. ECON. LIT. 595, 596 (2000); see also Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97
(1991) (discussing the basic assumptions of institutional economics).
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property and contract institutions, for example-that regulate economic activity
more directly. At one point, North poses the question: "[w]hat is it about
informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon the longrun character of economies?" 55 Neither he nor Williamson provides an answer.
The great majority of institutional economists, in Williamson's assessment,
simply take these norms "as given." 56
There have, however, been some significant exceptions. In 1994, for
example, Avner Greif published a widely-discussed paper on how differences
in "cultural beliefs-defined as "ideas . . . that are not empirically discovered or

analytically proven"-led medieval Maghribi and Genoese trader societies
down "distinct institutional trajectories." 57 He argued that the Maghribis
shared a religious belief that all members of the same umma ("nation") were
responsible for one another, whereas the Christian Genoese were far more
individualistic in both their religious beliefs and social behavior. These
"cultural" differences led Genoese merchants to compensate for their relative
lack of social capital by creating formal legal and administrative institutions,
whereas the Maghribis could rely on informal collective enforcement
mechanisms to impose social and moral sanctions against "deviants."
Greif's study inspired a moderate number of follow-up studies, most of
which attempt to identify correlations and potential causal relations between
"culture"-often dissected into measures of trust, individualism, and hierarchy,
but also sometimes equated with major religions such as Islam, Catholicism, or
Protestantism-and various institutional or economic outcomes.58 Several of
these focus specifically on the connection between "cultural factors" and
property institutions: some have argued that Catholic and Islamic countries
offer weaker protection of private property, 59 while others suggest that
societies with higher levels of social trust and individualism offer stronger
protection.60 In aggregate, these studies constitute a small but notable subset of
recent institutional economics work. As discussed above, however, they have
yet to make much of an imprint either on law and economics in general, or on
what one might call the law and economics branch of property theory.
B. Alternative Schools of Thought
Although law and economics remains, even in the eyes of its critics, the
55.

North, supra note 54, at 111.

&

56.
Williamson, supra note 54, at 596.
57.
Greif, supra note 1, at 914.
58. See Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999);
Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. EcON. 313 (2003);
Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of
Governance, 35 J. COMP. EcoN. 659 (2007); Mariko J. Klasing, The Cultural Roots of Institutions(Univ.
of St. Gallen, Working Paper Series, 2008); Guido Tabellini, Culture and Institutions: Economic
Development in the Regions ofEurope, 8 J. EUROPEAN ECON. Ass. 677 (2010); Claudia R. Williamson
& Carrie B. Kerekes, Securing Private Property: Formal Versus Informal Institutions, 54 J. LAW
EcON. 537 (2011); Claudia R. Williamson, Culture and the Cost of Contract Enforcement, working

paper (Miss. State Univ., March 6, 2014).
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"dominant" school in property theory, it is hardly the only school. The major
emerging alternative, a "progressive" school that criticizes law and economics
for focusing on "efficiency" as "the sole means of evaluating laws and
establishing property norms,"61 is, in fact, highly compatible with cultural
analysis at a theoretical level. For the most part, however, it has been a
normative literature and has shown relatively little interest in producing an
actual descriptive account of how cultural factors influence the creation of
property institutions.
This is not to say that "progressive property" has made no statement on
how and why property institutions are created: as several of its major figures
have stated, it seeks to examine the "underlying human values that property
serves and the social relationships it shapes and reflects." 62 Such an
examination, they argue, will show that "property implicates plural and
incommensurable values." 63 This stands in contrast to the economic analysis of
property, which, as progressive scholars correctly observe, generally applies
one all-encompassing value-usually "utility," and most often measured in
monetary terms. Some progressive scholars prefer to discuss these plural values
under a unified conceptual blanket-"freedom," or "flourishing"-but they
nonetheless insist that these blankets are "irreducibly plural concept[s]"64 and
must take into account the variety of "preferences, values and commitments"
that people may adopt.65 They also recognize "the significant role that our
social values play in our conception of property," and that property institutions
can "vary . . . according to the social context." 66 To quote Hanoch Dagan,

"[e]ach of our property institutions, as noted, targets a specific set of values to
be promoted by its constitutive rules in one subset of social life . . . ."67
Unfortunately, Dagan does not specify how property institutions came to
assume these promotional functions.
"Progressive property" is, therefore, theoretically consistent with the
possibility that "social culture" can play a significant role in the creation of
property institutions and would probably welcome the existence of "cultural
paradigms" in property institutions. An empirical account that demonstrates
how different societies construct property institutions based on different
internalized values would not only demonstrate the value of cultural analysis
but also provide serious support for the progressive claim of value pluralism
and its belief in the existence of more than just one paradigm of property. 68
For now, these possibilities remain largely unexplored. Over the past
decade or so, the progressive literature has been consistently more normative

61.
Rosser, supra note 33, at 110, see also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS (2011); Alexander, supra note 3; Rosser, supranote 33.
Alexander et al., supra note 3, at 743.
62.
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64.
AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 585 (2002).
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65.
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66. Dagan, supra note 3, at 7.
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than descriptive; its major works have usually shown more interest in either
presenting progressive property as a prescription for future institutional design
or in demonstrating its philosophical appeal than in demonstrating its empirical
superiority to economic accounts.69 To the extent that their preferred objectives
require some descriptive basis, they tend to quickly outline a couple of case
studies but rarely attempt more systematic empirical analysis.70 Even those
works that claim to "begin[] with a straightforward descriptive observation"71
rarely go beyond the case study level and, even at that level, rarely seek to
systematically demonstrate that their preferred interpretative framework is
objectively more plausible than law and economics-oriented alternatives. Some
progressive scholars do employ some variation of intellectual history, where
they demonstrate that leading intellectuals, jurists, or politicians of certain eras
wrote and thought about property in ways that lend support to their arguments,
but one can easily question whether high-level intellectual history is truly
reflective of ground-level socioeconomic realities.72
Consequently, the progressive literature and the law and economics
approach have tended to operate at somewhat different levels of empirical
detail and scope, which occasionally can give their debates an apples-tooranges quality. 73 There is certainly nothing wrong with being more normative
than descriptive, especially in the early stages of developing a school of
thought, but for the purposes of this article, the current progressive literature
offers some general theoretical compatibility with cultural analysis, but quite
little in theoretical specifics or empirical support. 74
Apart from the progressive literature, the most influential alternative in
property theory to economic analysis is probably Margaret Jane Radin's
"personhood" theory, which emphasizes the emotional and perhaps spiritual
investment in property ownership that conventional microeconomics often fails
to capture. 75 Similar to the progressive literature, the personhood theory is
potentially compatible with cultural analysis: at the very least, it seems to
tolerate the possibility that different cultural values could lead to different
levels and kinds of emotional investment. Also similar to the progressive
69.
Alexander, supra note 3, at 102, 107 (outlining the primary normative agendas of pluralist
property theory).
70.
E.g., JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 19-55 (2000).
71.
Dagan, supra note 3, at 28.
72.
PURDY, supra note 65; Anna di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The
Numerus Clausus Principleand Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 367

(2014).
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73. See, e.g., Rosser, supra note 33 (discussing the still ongoing debate over whether exclusion
is an innate feature of property). The progressive side has, I think it is fair to say, not been operating at
quite the same level of empirical ambition that the law and economics side has been. Cf Chang
Smith, supra note 43, with Robilant, supranote 72.
74. There have, of course, been several synthetic works of legal history that seem to lend some
support to progressive theories of property: LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
(3d ed. 2005); and STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY (2011) are perhaps the best examples. But
even here, serious cultural analysis is largely missing. Friedman's book, of course, covers the entirety of
American legal history, and can therefore discuss the history of property only in a highly abbreviated
manner. Banner, on the other hand, ultimately emphasizes technological advancement as the major
driver of legal change-a surprisingly Demsetz-ian conclusion.
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literature, however, is the lack of empirical exploration of this possibility. More
recently, Radin's work has taken on pluralist tendencies that strongly resemble
the progressive school, to the point where some scholars have begun to
consider her part of it. 76
C. FindingRoom for CulturalAnalysis
All in all, the major schools of modem property theory have thus far
devoted very little substantive attention to the potential influence cultural
factors exert over the creation of property institutions, even though their basic
theoretical frameworks, including those based on law and economics, are often
compatible with this possibility: like most forms of microeconomic analysis,
law and economics usually claims to maximize subjective "utility," for which
wealth is only a measure or a proxy. Utility functions, however, are often taken
to be exogenous, and beyond the scope of economic analysis. 77 It is
theoretically possible, at least, to fold what Ellickson calls the "internalization
of cultural values" into these black box-like utility functions. In other words,
cultural analysis studies how utility functions are formed, whereas economic
analysis takes those functions for granted.
This cannot, however, constitute a valid reason for property scholars to
ignore "the influence of culture." Property theory seeks to explain how property
institutions are formed, not merely to explore those parts of the process that
lend themselves most naturally to conventional microeconomic analysis.
Economists may well limit themselves to a certain methodology, but property
scholars as a group-if not necessarily as individuals-should not do so unless
they are reasonably sure that the methodology can produce something close to a
complete understanding of institutional formation. Our subject is property
itself, not the methodology.
Ellickson, as noted above, once cited the inaccessibility of sociology as
an explanation for why cultural analysis has been unpopular with
economically-minded legal scholars. 78 This may well be true, but it, too, falls
short of providing an actual justification: if preexisting sociological studies of
social culture have not offered coherent accounts of individual-level behavior,
then the best academic response is to try and provide one, not to despair of the
possibility. In fact, the institutional economics literature discussed above,
particularly Greif's work, demonstrates that it is quite possible to build
individual-level theories of human behavior that take sociocultural factors into
account.
A potentially more compelling way to reject cultural analysis is to
empirically argue that-irrespective of societal context, geographical region,
and historical era-individuals generally approached the creation and
modification of property institutions through similarly self-interested and
utilitarian mindsets: Because we do not observe major societal variation in

76.
77.
78.

Alexander, supra note 3, at 116-19.
See Stigler and Becker, supranote 24, at 88.
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, supra note 2.
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individual approaches to property regulation, there is apparently no reason to
believe that "culture," which is innately society and region-specific,
significantly influenced those approaches. A few major property articles have,
in fact, experimented with this strategy: Henry Smith and Yun-chien Chang, for
example, have recently argued that common law and civil law countrieswhich actually encompass most of the world's largest legal systems-possess
"remarkably similar" property institutions "for functional reasons." 79
Ellickson, too, pursued a somewhat similar line of argument in his seminal
"Property in Land" article, in which he argues that landowners across a
considerable variety of human societies adapted customary property institutions
to economic, demographic and ecological conditions in similarly wealthmaximizing ways. so Lending additional support to these arguments, a
considerable number of legal and economic historians have recently
demonstrated that individual patterns of property use tended to be similarly
wealth-maximizing, rational, and industrious across many historical societies,
both Western and Asiatic.8 1
Nonetheless, these empirical observations do not constitute sufficient
reason to reject the "influence of culture." They remain compatible with at least
two different theories of cultural influence: first, they do not rule out the
possibility that "economically utilitarian property use and regulation" is itself a
cultural or social construct. 82 They do mitigate against this argument-if only
because they make it more difficult to explain why these otherwise very
different societies eventually constructed similar cultures of individual
economic behavior-but they do not do so very decisively. For example, one
could hypothesize that only those societies that develop such an economic
culture are likely to reach a certain level of size and economic complexity

79.
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and that the historical studies discussed above focus, by design, on very large
and complex civilizations. If we turn our attention, as many anthropologists
have, to smaller, less economically developed societies, we might be tempted to
believe that many individuals and societies do not approach property use from a
utilitarian mind set.8
The second possibility, which is the one this Article explores in detail, is
that individual utilitarianism in property use can coexist with cultural
internalization in other areas of social behavior. This is, in fact, the strategy that
Greif and some of his fellow institutional economists have adopted. Greif, for
example, appears to believe that social compactness and individualism were
internalized values, whereas economic institutions such as contracts or formal
court systems were created via utilitarian calculations.85 This hearkens back to
North and Williamson's identification of different "levels" of human
institutions.86
As discussed above, property theory has largely declined to embrace this
particular strand of institutional economics. This may have something to do
with the flawed execution in these studies: somewhat surprisingly, Greif makes
no serious attempt to explain why compactness and individualism were truly
"cultural" characteristics.
Could these tendencies have emerged for reasons
other than value or belief internalization? Greif does not address this concern,
nor do the follow-up studies discussed above. Some, in fact, attempt to draw
correlations between religious systems and belief internalization in even
broader strokes than Greif.88
Timur Kuran's recent work offers a refreshing departure from these
tendencies: Kuran's 2011 manuscript on the "Long Divergence" between
Western Europe and the Middle East has drawn its share of critics, but at the
very least, it makes a serious and well-documented attempt to argue that
"certain institutions of great significance for investment, productivity, and
exchange were grounded in Islamic teachings." 90 His efforts demonstrate, at
least, that these specific shortcomings in Greif's work need not dissuade
scholars from accepting its broader insight that cultural factors can fruitfully
coexist with both methodological individualism and the belief that human

JONES, THE EUROPEAN MIRACLE: ENVIRONMENTS, ECONOMIES AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HISTORY OF
EUROPE AND ASIA (2d ed. 1981); and DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS:
WHY SOME ARE So RICH AND SOME SO POOR (1998).
84. E.g., PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT AMONG THE TIV (1989); GUDEMAN,
supra note 26; CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-234 (1983); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI,
CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (2014); LEOPOLD POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR
LAW (1959); ISSAC SHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM (1994); MAx GLUCKMAN,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (ZAMBIA) (2d ed. 1967).
85.
Greif, supra note 1, at 915-16, 922-25.
86.
Williamson, supra note 54, at 596 (discussing levels of institutions); see also North, supra
note 54, at 111 ("What is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon
the long-run character of economies?").
87.
Greif, supra note 1.
88.
Licht et al., supra note 58.
89.
E.g., Arshad Zaman, Review Article, ISLAMIC STUD., Summer 2010 at 277 (reviewing
TIMUR KHAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: How ISLAMIC LAW HELD BACK THE MIDDLE EAST (2011)).
90.
KURAN, supra note 81, at 25.
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beings generally approach property use through a materialistic and utilitarian
mindset.
One major common theme that emerges from this institutional economics
literature is its general reliance on comparative methods. Comparative
strategies, especially those that compare how different property systems deal
with similar economic problems, serve at least two major functions in cultural
analysis. First, as discussed above, what differentiates cultural analysis from
behavioral economics is primarily the examination of behavioral tendencies
that are not innate, but rather the product of post-birth socialization, education,
and indoctrination. In other words, cultural analysis' primary methodological
attraction is probably its ability to explain societal differences. Second,
comparative methods also help demonstrate the logical necessity of cultural
analysis: many factors can exert influence over any given social phenomenon,
but only those that help explain comparative differences have a strong claim on
necessity.
As noted above, the "progressive property" school also has much to gain
from comparative studies of cultural influence. It has thus far attempted to
illustrate its theoretical claim that property institutions can embody more than
one kind of social value through case studies drawn from American property
law.91 An equally compelling, indeed quite possibly more effective, strategy
would be to identify cultural norms that led different societies to calibrate
functionally comparable parts of their property laws in qualitatively different
ways. If the goal is to demonstrate the existence of value pluralism in property
use, then finding value pluralism across different societies works just as well as
finding it in one society.
All in all, contemporary property theory has largely neglected or declined
to seriously examine the potential influence of culture on property institutions.
There does not, however, seem to be any persuasive reason why it should
continue to do so. The remaining parts of this Article seek to provide positive
reasons for why cultural analysis is necessary for a reasonably complete
understanding of how property institutions are created.
II.

"RECULTURALIZING" PROPERTY THEORY

This Part constructs a cultural theory of how property institutions are
created. It argues that the following chain of causation is possible and may be
especially effective at explaining certain inter-society patterns of divergence in
property institutions. The cultural internalization of certain values and mores
leads to adoption of correlated status criteria, those criteria then influence the
power balance between certain interest groups, who negotiate and ultimately
produce various property norms based on their respective-potentially
utilitarian and self-interested-positions and bargaining power. There can,
therefore, be some significant correlation between a society's internalized
cultural values and its property institutions.

91.

There are exceptions. See sources cited supra note 4.
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This does not purport to be a complete theory of property, or even the
only possible "cultural" theory of property. The goal here is simply to
demonstrate that there are theoretically coherent ways of incorporating cultural
factors into property theory, even if we assume, following conventional law
and economics, that most individuals approach property use and regulation
through a self-interested and utilitarian mindset. As later Parts of the Article
will demonstrate, moreover, the theory provided here is compatible, perhaps
uniquely compatible, with some major sociolegal phenomena in early modem
history and helps explain some important institutional differences between
major Asiatic and European societies. The theoretical incorporation of cultural
internalization is therefore necessary if we are to understand several crucial
chapters in the global history of property.
The theory begins with the basic empirical observation that the creation
of property rules often produces clear winners and losers. This coexists a bit
uneasily with the tremendous amount of attention that economists have
traditionally devoted to finding Pareto-efficient solutions to institutional
problems. 92 Even the most optimistic of scholars would acknowledge,
however, that Pareto-efficiency is extremely elusive in practice 93 and therefore
compensate by applying what is commonly referred to as Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, in which an outcome is efficient if "a Pareto optimal outcome can be
reached by arranging sufficient compensation from those that are made better
off to those that are made worse off so that all would end up no worse off than
before." 94
See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 11-12 (1989)
92.
(suggesting that changes to property law should be such that "[t]he bargaining parties must see their
welfare improved or at least made no worse off'); Louis de Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs,

and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 64, 68 (1983) (noting that
neoclassical models of property rights evolution yield outcomes that are Pareto efficient); Eirik G.
Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature,
10 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1137 (1972) (discussing how the academic literature on property rights
addresses the issue of Pareto efficiency).
93. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 28-29; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96

COLUM. L. REv. 903, 955-56 (1996).
Allison Chaney, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, PRINCETON U., https://www.princeton.edu
94.
/-achaney/tmve/wikilO0k/docs/Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.html. (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). But this begs
the question of why the losers would agree to the outcome if compensation does not actually take place.
Some have proposed that it is rational for individuals to pursue Kaldor-Hicks efficiency at the group
level because, over the long run, they will be better off even if they occasionally lose. E.g., Ellickson,
supranote 1; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision

of Public Goods, 108 YALE L. J. 377 (1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1. There are two possible scenarios for
this. First, if "wins" and "losses" are distributed somewhat equally across all group members, each
individual group member will, in all likelihood, eventually win more than they lose. Second, even if we
assume that some individuals always win and some always lose, long-term wealth accumulation over a
series of Kaldor-Hicks group decisions by regular winners could nonetheless have a trickle-down effect
on the welfare of regular losers. Both scenarios have significant weaknesses. The first simply seems
incompatible with the enormous amount of scholarship on various forms of social oppression and
structural inequality. This literature is obviously much too vast to cite here. A celebrated recent
reiteration of the argument that inequality is innately built into certain socioeconomic forms, particularly
capitalism, is, of course, THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). This
echoes the arguments made by I KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben
Fowkes trans., 2004). For others, inequality is not so much an innate feature of capitalism as it is the
result of elites twisting social, cultural, and political institutions to sustain their dominance. See PIERRE
BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: ESSAYS ON ART AND LITERATURE (1993). It seems
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Even so, for the more empirically-minded, it is probably simpler, and
ultimately much more realistic, to accept that property institutions are
sometimes-indeed very often-not the outcome of consensual pursuit of
"efficient" outcomes, but rather the result of winners imposing their will and
preferences on the losers. The losers do not acquiesce because of murky longterm benefits but because the short-term cost of clashing with the winners is too
high. This is not to deny that Pareto-efficient outcomes are possible, or that it
may sometimes be rational for losers to accept Kaldor-Hicks efficient
outcomes, but rather to suggest that there are different processes of institutional
creation at work.
The belief that legal or quasi-legal institutions in general, and property
institutions in particular, are often created via a political process in which the
interests of certain social groups "win" over the interests of others is, of course,
commonplace in many branches of social science. 95 The field of property
theory, however, has been somewhat slow to expressly embrace this belief. As
Katrina Wyman has observed, until quite recently, most major theories on the
origin and evolution of property rights tended to neglect the role of the
"political process," instead assuming that property rights were largely the
product of voluntary, even unanimous, social decisions.96 If, however, we
accept that there are winners and losers in process of creating property
institutions, the question then becomes: who tend to be the winners, and who
tend to be the losers?
There are many possible answers, including how important an issue is to
a particular individual, relative physical proximity to the affected properties,
varying information costs imposed on interested parties, or even different levels
of mental and physical ability. This Article argues, however, that one of the
most crucial factors over the long run is the relative social and political status
of interested parties. Conventionally, social status is the rank of either an
individual or a group in a social hierarchy of honor, prestige, or perceived
merit,97 and can depend on a variety of factors, such as physical prowess,
academic achievement, popularity, wealth, religious piety, age, or lineage.98
quite obvious that, in many communities, there are those who lose far more frequently than they win,
and vice versa. The second scenario, on the other hand, will only generate individual-level "loser
support" for a Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome if the losers are somehow capable of predicting the longterm trickle-down effect. But that would necessarily assume that they possess absurdly high information
collection and processing abilities, especially when economists cannot even agree on whether trickledown effects really exist. See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, Recession Economics, N.Y. REVIEW OF
BooKs, Feb. 4 1982, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1982/feb/04/recession-economics/;
Heather Stewart, Wealth Doesn't Trickle Down-It Just Floods Offshore, Research Reveals, THE
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/2 I/offshore-wealth-global
-economy-tax-havens.
95.
This literature is, of course, vast. For a basic literature review of public choice theory, see
James M. Buchanan, Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program, CTR

(2003), http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/pdf%/20links/Booklet.pdf
96. See Wyman, supra note 6.
97. See, e.g., Yoram Weiss & Chaim Fershtman, Social Status and Economic Performance:A
Survey, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 801, 802 (1998); Social Status, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/55 1450/social-status (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) ("Social status [is] . .
the relative rank that an individual holds . .. in a social hierarchy based upon honour or prestige.").
98. See Xiaotian Zhang, Status Inconsistency Revisited: An Improved Empirical Model, 24
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The reputational and material costs of contradicting a higher social status
person tend to outweigh those of contradicting a lower status one.
Correspondingly, higher social status individuals also tend to possess greater
political power and status.9
This is, of course, necessarily a long-term approximation: in any given
case, a lower status individual may very well be able to advance her
institutional preferences over those of a higher status individual because she
cares more about the issues at hand and is willing to devote more social capital
to them, or because she has better access to information. Over the long run,
however, these relatively contingent and individualized advantages will
probably even out at the group level. When this happens, relative social status
will be a fairly accurate predictor of how often, and to what extent, different
individuals can obtain desirable institutional outcomes. 1 0o
Alternatively, from the perspective of comparative scholarship, if large,
similarly constituted societies in comparable economic circumstances-that is,
if comparable segments of their respective populations share similar
preferences of similar intensity on comparable economic issues-consistently
end up with different property norms, then we should take seriously the
likelihood that different distributions of social status within each society are
driving the institutional divergence. First, the size of the societies will smooth
out differences in individual intelligence or physical ability. Second, the
consistency of the divergence over time smooths out short-term changes in
institutional preferences or information access. Finally, similarity between
economic conditions suggests that purely materialistic explanations are unlikely
to succeed.
If all these conditions are met, then a status-based public choice theory
seems highly attractive: if the individuals who support establishing property
norm A in Society 1 collectively have higher relative status-compared to
opponents of norm A-than the individuals who support norm A or its
equivalent in Society 2, then we would naturally expect that norm A has a
higher chance to emerge in Society 1 than in Society 2. Essentially, status
distributions determine the relative bargaining power of different interest
groups, leading to different institutional outcomes.
It is rarely acceptable, however, to simply take status distributions as
exogenous: a satisfactory theory must also explain how the specific
distributions of status it utilizes to explain property institutions were created in
the first place. One way to begin this inquiry is to ask why the formal criteria
by which status is allocated often differ dramatically from society to society:

EUR. SOC. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (noting the complex factors that affect the calculation of social status).
Of course, one could ask why we should not simply discard the status moniker and simply
99.
focus on power. The answer is that "power" is too broad a term to be applied with much analytical
precision, whereas status corresponds to a specific kind of power-subjective, perceived, and often
intertwined with concepts of legitimacy-that is of particular relevance to how power is obtained in
modem societies. A man who holds a gun to my head has power over me, as does someone who has lent
me money, but they do not hold higher status than I do.
100. This leads, of course, to structural inequality where certain social classes and groups are
able to sustain their dominance over long periods of time. See discussion at supra note 94.
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there are aristocracies, where status depends on lineage, gerontocracies, where
it depends on seniority, and formal plutocracies, where wealth is explicitly the
primary determinant. 101 Socialist societies often claim, at least, to value
fundamentally different personal traits than capitalist ones.102 Much of this
may be rhetorical, but if we look past the rhetoric, and instead at the actual
correlations between sociopolitical stature and factors such as wealth or ageas the remainder of this Article attempts to do-there is still considerable
reason to believe that different societies can indeed allocate status based on
qualitatively different criteria. 0 3
Assuming, then, that there is at least a serious theoretical possibility that
different communities and societies sometimes choose fundamentally different
status allocation criteria, why do they do that? There are both materialist and
non-materialist ways to answer this. The materialist answer would point to the
possibility that the different status allocation criteria were simply pragmatic
reactions to different economic, ecological, or geopolitical circumstances. It
makes sense to tie status to military achievement, for example, in a resourcepoor country that relies on external conquest or colonization for economic
sustenance.' Alternatively, rich city-states that rely heavily on commerce and
trade might give higher status to the wealthy. 05 In other words, the old Marxist
axiom of "economic base determines superstructure" applies.
The alternative would be to emphasize the cultural agency that both
human societies and individual human beings possess-to argue that they do
not merely react passively to material circumstances, but in some cases act
according to internalized social values. 1 In this scenario, status hierarchies

101. Aristocracies were arguably the dominant European form of political organization for most
the past two millennia, beginning with the Roman Empire. See, e.g., ROBERT BARTLETT, THE MAKING
OF EUROPE: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 950-1350, at 24-59 (1993);
JONATHAN DEWALD, THE EUROPEAN NOBILITY, 1400-1800 (1996); JOHN MATTHEWS, WESTERN
ARISTOCRACIES AND IMPERIAL COURT, AD 364-425 (1990); SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS:
THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED (1994). Later Parts of this Article argue that Qing and
Republican local society was, to a significant extent, a gerontocracy, whereas early modem English
society was, to a large extent, a plutocracy dominated by the landed classes. Many would argue, of
course, that modem capitalism has a worrying tendency to become plutocratic. For a very recent version
of this argument, see JOHN SKINNER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, SOCIAL PLUTOCRACY: AN AMERICAN
CRISIS (2014).
102. For a recent discussion on the evolution of popular political culture-including
perceptions of individual self-worth and social prestige-in pre-1978 China, see WU YI-CHING, THE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: CHINESE SOCIALISM IN CRISIS (2014). On political culture
in socialist societies, see generally Kenneth Jowitt, An OrganizationalApproach to PoliticalCulture in
Marxist-LeninistSystems, 68 AM. POL. SC. REV. 1171 (1974).
103. See discussion infra Part IV.B, IV.C.
104. On the martial culture of the Mongols, see THOMAS T. ALLSEN, CULTURE AND CONQUEST
IN MONGOL EURASIA (2001). On the political culture of Vikings, see ANGELO FORTE ET AL., VIKING
EMPIRES 170-216 (2005).
105. On the political culture of Italian city-states, see DANIEL WALEY & TREVOR DEAN, THE
ITALIAN CITY-REPUBLICS 128-69 (4th ed. 2013).
106. See Greif, supranote 1; Ellickson, supra note 1; Etzioni, supra note 2; Cooter, supra note
2, at 1. For more general discussions on the topic, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF
DEMOCRACY: DECISION-MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENTS (1965); HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 1976); Amartya Sen, Rationalfools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
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and the criteria upon which they are based may not be what is materially
necessary or optimal, or the equilibrium outcome of self-interested negotiation,
but rather what members of the society have "internalized" as right, moral, or
just. Cultural internalization can kick in at any point in a society's history: one
can easily imagine a set of status criteria emerging initially through utilitarian
bargaining, but later becoming internalized as a core moral principle. That is,
later generations may take for granted what earlier generations fought over.
This would still be a qualitatively different process than path dependence,
which occurs when later generations decide that the costs of revising the
criteria outweigh the potential benefits of revision. 07 In contrast, cultural
internalization would, at some level, void the cost-benefit analysis in favor of
moral commitment.
A law and economics scholar who is committed to methodological
individualism may well harbor doubts about both the plausibility and
desirability of cultural internalization.ios The plausibility question would likely
come in the following form: why would an individual internalize a set of status
criteria that has the potential to damage his or her material interests? As noted
above, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that individual
economic behavior in early modem and modem societies was strongly
utilitarian and self-interested, and there is certainly no reason to believe that
contemporary societies are any less utilitarian. Can the cultural internalization
of status criteria be consistent with a basic assumption of individual economic
utilitarianism?
The simplest answer to these concerns would be to point out that
individual utilitarianism in things like land use and wealth management does
not imply that human beings are similarly utilitarian in other parts of their
behavior. There is, fortunately, a less cynical way to put this: it seems very
possible that status hierarchies and criteria are usually introduced to individuals
at a far earlier stage of life than economic decision making regarding land or
other major sources of livelihood. Correspondingly, there is some reason to
suspect that the former is more susceptible to value internalization than the
latter.
Status criteria are probably among the earliest norms a child is exposed to
as he or she develops cognitive reasoning abilities. Parents are usually the first
and primary source of authority and hierarchy, with other adult relatives,
babysitters or nannies, teachers, and other children following closely behind.
Young children rapidly acquire a fairly accurate and nuanced sense of which
people to respect and obey, and also of which personal traits to value and
prioritize. 1 In particular, children born in highly religious or morally
107. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the "Carriers of History"?: Path
Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizationsand Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE
& ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependency, Lock-in, and

History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995); James Mahoney, Path Dependency in HistoricalSociology,
29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507 (2000); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of
Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCL REV. 251 (2000).
108. See sources cited supranote 27.
109. E.g., CAROLYN U. SHANTZ, DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION (1975); John D. Coie et
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consolidated societies will likely be introduced to basic religious or moral
tenets, including those regarding status hierarchies, well before they reach
adolescence.' 10

In comparison, while almost all children experience basic urges to acquire
food, or to hoard toys, few are exposed, even in early modem agrarian
societies, to serious wealth management problems or to property norms and
laws until a much more advanced age-that is, these are usually "adult
problems."" It may simply be that serious economic planning or substantive
thinking about property norms requires fairly mature reasoning abilities and is
therefore something that most individuals do not grapple with until a relatively
advanced age, whereas basic status criteria require only elementary cognitive
abilities to understand and digest. Justifying status criteria is, of course, vastly
more complicated, but the point of value internalization is precisely to render
conscious justification unnecessary.
There is a considerable body of psychological research, going back to
Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg, which argues that children acquire their
internalized normative preferences at a young age and that younger children
tend to be more normatively malleable than older ones.1 12 Such assertions
remain commonplace." 3 This suggests that there is some basis for suspecting
that status criteria, by virtue of their extremely early introduction in the average
person's life, may be more "internalizable" than property norm preferences,
which are generally not developed until many years later. In fact, status criteria

&

al., Dimensions and Types of Social Status: A Cross-Age Perspective, 18 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 557 (1982); Patricia H. Hawley, The Ontogenesis of Social Dominance: A Strategy-Based
Evolutionary Perspective, 19 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 97 (1999). There have also been studies that
consider whether humans have an innate need for status hierarchies. E.g., HAROLD J. LEAVITT, TOP
DOWN: WHY HIERARCHIES ARE HERE TO STAY AND How TO MANAGE THEM MORE EFFECTIVELY
(2004); ARNOLD S. TANNENBAUM ET AL., HIERARCHY IN ORGANIZATIONS (1974); Joe C. Magee
Adam D. Galinsky, Social Hierarchy: The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Power and Status, 2 ACAD. OF
MGMT. ANNALS 351 (2008); Jessica L. Tracy & David Matsumoto, The Spontaneous Expression of
Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC.

U.S. 11655 (2008).
110. E.g., Everett L. Worthington Jr., Religious Faith across the Life Span, 17 COUNSELING
PSYCHOLOGIST 555 (1989); David Elkind, The Child's Conception of His Religious Denomination II:
The Catholic Child, 101 J. GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY 185 (1962).
111. There is some consensus that this is true in contemporary populations. Annamaria Lusardi
et al., Financial Literacy Among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15352, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5352;
Haiyang Chen & Ronald P. Volpe, An Analysis of Personal Financial Literacy Among College Students,
7 FIN. SERV. REV. 107 (1998). There is also quite a bit of evidence on this for pre-modem and early
modem Europe. See ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY
PROPERTY AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1978); JAN DE VRIES, THE INDUSTRIOUS REVOLUTION:
CONSUMER DEMAND AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY, 1650 TO THE PRESENT (2008).
112. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie Cabain trans.,
1965); see also LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES
AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 409-12 (1981); RICHARD WOLLHEIM, FREUD 177-218 (1971); PARENTING
AND CHILDREN'S INTERNALIZATION OF VALUES: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Joan E.
Grusec & Leon Kuczynski ed., 1997); Joan E. Grusec & Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Impact of Parental
Discipline Methods on the Child's Internalization of Values: A Reconceptualization ofCurrent Points of
View, 30 DEVELOPMENT PSYCH. 4 (1994); K.V. Roe, Early Empathy Development in Children and the
Subsequent Internalization of Moral Values, I 10 J. SOC. PSYCH. 147 (1980).

113. Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. L. & ECON.
715 (2008) (citing HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (1989)). But see Etzioni, supra note

2.
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are encountered and accepted so early in most people's lives that, if we allow
for any possibility of non-self-interested norm internalization at all, they would
probably be one of the most likely candidates.
So much for plausibility, but what about desirability? Why should we
seriously investigate a cultural internalization theory of status hierarchies when,
as noted above, there are plenty of materialistic alternatives available? The
basic answer is that, while it may not be a bad idea to consider the materialistic
alternatives first, there are also some fairly commonplace scenarios, especially
historically, where the materialistic theories run into serious difficulties, but
where a cultural internalization account would work very well. The basis for
this argument is the apparent truism that societal-level phenomena deserve
societal-level explanations: applied to the proliferation of status criteria, it
would mean that a widely embraced set of criteria deserves an origins story that
explains not merely why it makes sense in any specific locality but why it
became popular across so many different communities.
In some cases, it could simply be that different parts of society share
enough core material traits-economic production, ecology, geopolitical
challenges, and so on-that a purely organic, bottom-up, and materialistic norm
creation process would still have generated similar status criteria. In other
cases, however, a society can possess so much material diversity that it
becomes extremely difficult to imagine how status criteria-homogeneity came
to exist without the interference of exogenous, societal-wide factors.
Take, for example, the case of Qing China: within its economic core,
some macro-regions produced wheat, others rice, still others a mixture of the
two. 114 In some regions, the primary commercial good, apart from grain, was
silk, in others, salt, tea, or tobacco. Water-based transportation and trade was
readily available in some regions, extremely expensive in others.
Correspondingly, the level of urbanization and proto-industrialization varied
wildly from region to region.115 Despite all this, as will be argued below, most
local communities within its core macroregions seemed to coalesce around a
common set of status criteria. It simply seems unlikely that a bottom-up
ecological or economic need-based theory of norm creation can explain the
coexistence of normative uniformity with such vast ecological and economic
variance. To do that, we would have to identify some hidden but crucial
material characteristic shared by the core Chinese macroregions that drove their
local communities towards a single mode of social ordering. The precise nature
and socioeconomic consequences of Chinese social hierarchies, as discussed
below, make this appear a virtually impossible task.
The challenge then becomes to identify an exogenous cross-regional
"force" that can account for the normative uniformity. For modem societies,

114. THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 211 (G. William Skinner ed., 1977); Jonathan D.
Spence, The Search for Modem China 75-78 (1999).
115. Compare the description of the Lower Yangtze economy in BOZHONG LI, AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN, 1620-1850, at 107-08 (1998), with the description of the North China
economy in PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NORTH CHINA 11820(1985).
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the obvious solution would probably be to consider political economy-based
theories of centralized state action. Modem state and legal apparatuses are,
especially in developed countries, centralized, complex, and powerful enough
to offer an extremely large range of such possibilities: legislation,
administrative rulemaking, public education, or even the establishment of a
state religion could all provide ample material or political incentives, both
positive and negative, to adopt a certain set of status criteria.116
If, however, we turn our attention once again to pre-modem or early
modem societies, then it becomes much harder to argue that centralized state
activity was driving social norm creation through coercion or incentivizing.
Simply put, states were usually not that powerful back then, especially-and
ironically, considering the longevity of the "oriental despotism" thesis-in nonWestern societies.117 Returning to the Chinese example, historians generally
agree that late imperial governments rarely interfered with local socioeconomic
life and, indeed, did not have the financial resources to do so even when they
desired a more active role." There is very little reason to believe that local
communities felt at all compelled or substantially incentivized to seek state
approval for their preferred status criteria. Quite the opposite, local
communities very often violated express legal prohibitions to establish the kind
of kinship networks and hierarchies that they preferred.' 19
This implies, then, that local communities had to have voluntarily
accepted and sustained these status hierarchies, but often not for economic or
ecological reasons. What potential explanations, then, do we have left? We
could try, presumably, to construct a coordination game where the chosen set of
status criteria acquired focal point status out of a set of multiple available
criteria, none that were more materially attractive at the group level than
others,120 but this, too, runs into serious difficulties, especially in the China
case: if economic and ecological variation is inconsistent with one set of
criteria being materially optimal in most local communities, then it is probably
equally inconsistent with the "multiple equilibria pools" in these communities

116. On the ability of laws to shape social norms, see, for example, TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE
TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1998); RICHARD
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008); Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology and Morality, in 50 MORAL
COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 101 (D. Medin
et al. eds., 2009); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. HardShoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349 (1997); and Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995).
117. See discussion infra p.34. On legal orientalism, see William P. Alford, Law, Law, What
Law?: Why Western Scholars of Chinese History and Society Have Not HadMore to Say about Its Law,
23 MODERN CHINA 398 (1997); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
118. See discussion infra note 156.
119. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1 and IV.B.2.
120. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-67 (1960); Maarten C.W.
Janssen, Focal Points, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 150 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998); Richard McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory,
and Law, 82 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 173 (2009); Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of

Expressive Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 339 (2000); Maarten C.W. Jaanssen, Rationalizing Focal Points, 50
THEORY & DECISION 119 (2001); Robert Sugden, A Theory ofFocalPoints, 105 Econ. J. 533 (1995).
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all sharing one particular equilibrium. In fact, the set of status criteria that
ultimately "emerged victorious" in late imperial China arguably did a very poor
job, when compared to available alternatives, of boosting economic efficiency
and protecting social stability.121 Focal point theories cannot explain this.
At this point, it is far simpler to look into cultural explanations-to
examine whether there is a coherent account of value and norm internalization
that could explain the popularity of these status criteria. There are at least two
major possibilities. First, people internalized the criteria themselves, or at least
certain mores or values that supported them. Second, people internalized a
desire-not connected to any direct material incentive-to imitate the
sociopolitical elite, who possessed certain quantities of innate "moral
prestige.,,122 This would presumably drive them to adhere to whatever status
criteria they believed the elite abided by. In the historical evidence surveyed
below, the former possibility is much more pronounced than the latter, but the
latter certainly could have played a significant role, both here and in other
social scenarios.
Some might argue that going straight to cultural internalization overlooks
the possibility that social groups or individuals might adopt certain status
criteria because they believe it will boost their social status or reputation among
peers-assuming, as discussed above, that the criteria do not make economic or
ecological sense. 123 This is plausible, but it leads to a chick-and-egg
conundrum: why would these groups or individuals believe that these criteria
will boost their reputation unless they also believed that their peers had already
internalized them? That is, such a mindset might explain why newcomers to a
region with pre-established norms chose to abide by those norms,124 but it
cannot explain how the norms initially emerged.
A few additional notes on how this study differs from previous attempts
to compare property systems: Greif's theory of cultural influence is
thematically quite similar to what is being attempted here but, as discussed
above, makes no real attempt to demonstrate that the "cultural factors" it relies
,,125
The account below attempts both to present a
upon are actually "cultural".
thicker account of social culture and to demonstrate that its emergence,
predominance, and longevity demand an internalization-based explanation.
Smith and Yun-chien Chang have recently produced an important
comparative study of property frameworks in common law and civil law
systems. They find that these legal systems differ more in form than in
substance, and all display a strong commitment to "the right to exclude, in rem
121. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
122. On the imitation of elite culture and rights by the general population, see, for example,
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151,
1165-89 (2004) (describing how European elite concepts of privacy and dignity came to be embraced by
the general population).
123. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338 (1997) (providing a theory of social norms based on reputation sanctions); and ERIC
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) on reputational sanctions and the value of signaling.
124. See Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The Evolution of Norms, 106 AM. J. Soc. 1493,

1496 (2001).
125.

See discussion surrounding supra notes 87-91.
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status and running with assets." 126 The account presented below is, in fact,
compatible with this: it is perfectly possible that the basic principles of private
property use are similar in most commercial economies due to the information
cost issues that Smith and Chang identify. Nonetheless, substantive differences
on narrower issues of use and alienability-the specific terms of tenancy
termination, the length of mortgage redemption windows, the division of
inheritable assets, and so on-may well exist within this common framework
and, despite their more limited scope, be of enormous socioeconomic
consequence.
III. FROM STATUS DISTRIBUTIONS TO PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS

Parts III and IV apply the theoretical framework outlined in Part II to the
pre-industrial legal history of China, England, and Japan. The chain of
causation in this framework runs, as discussed above, from cultural norms of
status allocation to distributions of sociopolitical power, to property
institutions. This Part illustrates the latter part of this chain: it argues that major
differences in mortgage institutions between pre-industrial China, England, and
Japan had roots in their different distributions of sociopolitical status. Lowerincome households consistently occupied a large share of political leadership
positions in the early modem Chinese countryside, but were largely excluded
from such positions in Tokugawa Japan, and almost completely excluded in
early modem England. Correspondingly, they were able to secure very
favorable mortgage redemption norms in China but accepted much harsher
norms in Japan and succumbed to extremely harsh ones in England.
At around two centuries prior to large-scale industrialization, correlating
to the mid-eighteenth century in China, mid-xixteenth in England, and early
eighteenth in Japan, the three rural economies had a great deal in common.
Recent historical scholarship strongly suggests that all three economies were
significantly commercialized, with large segments of their rural populationsin core macroregions, at least-producing food and textile materials for market
consumption. 127 The corresponding drive to specialize production led to
improving living standards for most rural households, although natural disasters
and famine remained a real threat. All three economies were fairly selfcontained: foreign trade, while certainly a growing presence, only accounted
for a fraction of total economic output.128 They were also predominantly rural,
126. Chang & Smith, supra note 43.
127. On Chinese market integration, see, for example, Yeh-Chien Wang, One Secular Trends of
Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta, 1638-1935, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 81, at 35, 35-99; HUANG supra note 115; BOZHONG Li, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
JIANGNAN, 1620-1850, at 107-08 (1998); LILLIAN M. LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN NORTH CHINA: STATE,
MARKET, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE 1690s-1990s, at 113, 164-65, 196-220 (2007). For
comparisons with England, see POMERANZ, supra note 81; ROBERT ALLEN, THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009). On Japanese market integration, see Jean-Pascal

Bassino, Market Integration and Famines in Early Modem Japan, 1717-1857 (Nov. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), http://federation.ens.fr/ydepot/semin/texte0708/BAS2007MAR.pdf.
&

128. On the modest size of early modem English trade, see RALPH DAVIS, THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION AND BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE 62-63 (1979); and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
James Robinson, The Rise of Europe. Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95
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with well over eighty percent of the population engaged in agricultural
production. 129
Beyond these broad macroeconomic similarities, the three societies also
shared some finer characteristics. First, their rural economies were dominated
by smallholder households at this point in time. In two of China's most
developed macroregions, the Lower Yangtze and North China, the top ten
percent of landowners probably owned, respectively, around forty and twenty
percent of arable land, and only managed ten to fifteen percent themselves,
which meant that some eighty to ninety percent of arable land was being tilled
by household-sized production units.130 A similar situation existed in England
during the early seventeenth century,131 and in Japan during the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries.132
Second, the ownership-and, in cases of tenancy, usage-rights of these
smallholder households were generally secure. Most smallholders owned much
of the land they farmed in China, and enjoyed what modem lawyers would
recognize as secure private control: the ability, guaranteed by both formal and
customary law, to exclude others, the sole authority to enjoy after-tax produce,
and close-to-full control over land usage.1 33 Those who leased land from larger
landlords often enjoyed highly secure tenancy rights under a system called-"one
land two owners" (yitian liangzhu), which prevented them from being evicted
except under some fairly extreme circumstances.1 34 In early sixteenth century

AM. ECON. REV. 546 (2005). On Chinese foreign trade, see Wolfgang Keller, Ben Li & Carol H. Shive,
China's Foreign Trade: Perspectivesfrom the Past 150 Years, 34 WORLD ECON. 853 (2011). On Japan,
see Daniel M. Bernhofen & John C. Brown, An Empirical Assessment of the Comparative Advantage
Gainsfrom Trade: Evidence from Japan, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 208 (2005).
129. On England, see Robert C. Allen, Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in
Europe, 1300-1800, 4 EUR. R. ECON. HIST. 1, 11 (2000); S. Todd Lowry, The Agricultural Foundation
of the Seventeenth-Century English Oeconomy, 35 HiST. POL. ECON. 74, 75 (2003); and Theofanis C.
Tsoulouhas, A New Look at Demographic and Technological Changes: England, 1550 to 1839, 29
EXPLORATIONS IN EcON. HIST. 169, 176-77 (1992) (using data from EDWARD A.EDWARD A. WRIGLEY
& ROGER S. SCHOFIELD, THE POPULIST HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1541-1871 A RECONSTRUCTION (1981)).
On China and Japan, see James I. Nakamura & Matao Miyamoto, Social Structure and Population
Change: A Comparative Study of Tokugawa Japan and Ch'ing China, 30 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
RR), Ming Qing Zaoqi Gongyehua Shehuide Xingchengyu
CHANGE 229 (1982); and Yu Tongyuan (5Y

Fazhan (
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[The Formation and Development of Early

IndustralizedSociety in Jiangnan in Ming-Qing Period], II J. HIST. SCI. (2007).
130. Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline
ofPre-IndustrialChina, 13 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 129 (2011).
131. Leigh Shaw-Taylor, The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism and the Decline of Family Farming
in England, 65 ECON. HIST. REV. 26, 31-36 (2011); ROBERT C. ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN:
THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH MIDLANDS 1450-1850, at 73, tbl.4-4, 78-104
(1992); Stephen Hipkin, The Structure of Land Ownership and Land Occupation in the Romney Marsh

Region, 1646-1834, 51 AGRIC. HIST. REV. 69, 69 (2003).
132. SMITH, supra note 17; THOMAS C. SMITH, NATIVE SOURCES OF JAPANESE
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1750-1920 (1988).
133. See Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China, in CONTRACT
AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 17-8 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko & Robert Gardella
eds., 2004). Private property became a predominant feature of the Chinese economy as early as the 12th
and 13 h Centuries. See Joseph P. McDermott, Charting Blank Spaces and Disputed Regions: The

Problem ofSung Land Tenure, 44 J. ASIAN STUD. 13, 13 (1984).
134. E.g., KATHRYN BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: THE LOWER
YANGTZE REGION, 1840-1950, at 25 (1992); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL
PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED 99-118 (2001).
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England, most smallholders held copyhold tenure over their land, which
enjoyed a level of legal protection in both common law and manorial courts
comparable to freehold land. 135 In Japan, too, secure private ownershiptechnically of usage rights, given the country's feudal superstructuregradually became the dominant kind of property right during the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, triggering a large rise in permanent investments in land and
irrigation during the following three centuries.136
Third, landholders in all three countries also enjoyed considerable
freedom to alienate their property rights. Land selling, leasing, and mortgaging
was routine in the Chinese countryside. This applied not only to owners but
also to tenants as well, who often transferred, subleased, and mortgaged their
tenancy rights, especially when they were of the "one land two owners"
variety.1 37 Early modem English copyholders sold, mortgaged, and leased their
land through basically the same legal instruments as freeholders.138 Japanese
landholders, while theoretically banned from selling land by Tokugawa law,
nonetheless found a number of ways to circumvent these restrictions. 139
Fourth, the primary impetus for landholders, whether Chinese, English, or
Japanese, to sell or mortgage land was serious financial stress: upcoming
weddings, funerals, or large debts coming due.1 40 Median or lower-income
rural households, in particular, usually could only meet these financial demands
through the selling or mortgaging of land. Outside of these circumstances-in
which a failure to raise cash could trigger severe social penalties-they rarely
put their land up for sale or mortgage, and indeed for very good reason: given
the relative paucity of non-agricultural employment in these pre-industrial
economies, the price of land would have had to be extraordinarily high for
significant numbers of peasants to willingly put their property on the market.141
135. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 348-50 (3d ed. 1990);
ERIC KERRIDGE, AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 32-93 (1969); S. F. C.
MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 41-64 (2d ed. 1981).
136. See RAMSEYER, supra note 19, at 26-27; Osumu Saito, Land, Labour and Market Forces
in Tokugawa Japan, 24 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 169, 170-71 (2009). But see Philip C. Brown, State,
Cultivator, Land: Determinationof Land Tenures in Early Modern Japan Reconsidered, 56 J. ASIAN
STUD. 421 (1997) (arguing that some villages redistributed land fairly regularly).
137. Kenneth Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23
CONTINUITY &CHANGE 10, 131-36 (2008).
138. See sources cited supranote 135.
139. See RAMSEYER, supra note 19 at 26.
140. On China and England, see TAISU ZHANG, LAWS AND ECONOMICS OF CONFUCIANISM:
KINSHIP, PROPERTY, AND AGRICULTURAL CAPITALISM IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL CHINA AND ENGLAND 37
(forthcoming 2016); THE BRENNER DEBATE: AGRARIAN CLASS STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE 10-63, 236 (T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1987);
Phillipp R. Schofield, Dearth, Debt and the Local Land Market in a Late Thirteenth-Century Village
Community, 45 AGRIC. HIST. REV. 1 (1997); Govind Sreenivasan, The Land-Family Bond at Earls
Colne (Essex) 1550-1650, 131 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1991) (documenting the unwillingness of English
peasants to sell land); and Zvi Razi, Family, Land and the Village Community in Later Medieval
England, 93 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1981). On the economic incentives to sell land in Tokugawa Japan, see
SMITH, supra note 17, at 8158 ("[Mortgaging documents] show that borrowing by peasants usually
originated in poverty . . . ."); WILLIAM CHAMBLISS, CHIARAlIJMA VILLAGE: LAND TENURE, TAXATION,
AND LOCAL TRADE, 1811-1884, at 36-37 (1965) (noting that selling or mortgaging land tended to
indicate declining economic fortunes); and Tsutomu Ouchi, Chiso kaisei zengo no nominsho no bunkai
tojinushisei, in 1 CHISO KAISEI NO KENKYU 37 (Uno Kozo ed., 1957).
141. On China, see HUANG, supra note 134, at 73; and Madeleine Zelin, The Rights of Tenants
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The large number of smallholders who were forced to sell or mortgage land due
to financial stress, however, kept prices substantially lower than that. For
similar reasons, larger landholders who had access to spare cash were usually
eager to acquire additional land.
These basic incentives created some fairly strong income-based divisions
between sellers/debtors and buyers/creditors: larger landholders rarely needed
to sell land to make ends meet, whereas smallholders frequently did. In two
North China villages, for example, nearly ninety percent of land mortgagors
and sellers during the later 1930s came from the bottom half of landholders,
whereas only three percent belonged to the top twenty-five percent. 142
Moreover, nearly all existing contract archives from Qing and Republican
China suggest that land mortgages and sales generally involved a few large
landholders accumulating land from dozens of poorer neighbors.143 The same
was true of both England and Japan, where existing historical sources
document a steady flow of land from smallholders to wealthier households in
the early modem era, but very little in the other direction.
Finally, customary law, rather than formal legal regulations, tended to
govern how landholders (usually smallholders) could sell and mortgage land
(usually to a wealthier neighbor). As discussed below, central level laws and
regulations in China and Japan were often ignored, both by local communities
and even by local courts. The English common law enjoyed a relatively more
harmonious coexistence with local customs, but even there, manor and borough
customs played a larger role in regulating land use and transaction than formal
legal institutions. 145 In general, early modem governments were rarely
powerful and expansive enough to effectively regulate local economic
behavior. 146
These, then, were the broader socioeconomic conditions under which
early modem Chinese, English, and Japanese rural communities contemplated
and created mortgage institutions. The scope and depth of these macro-level
in Mid-Qing Sichuan: A Study of Land-Related Lawsuits in the Baxian Archives, 45 J. ASIAN STUD. 499,
514-517 (1986). On Japanese labor markets, see Saito, supra note 136, at 176.
142. 3 Chugoku Noson Kanko Chosa [Investigation of Rural Chinese Customs] [hereinafter
Mantetsu Surveys] 5 (Comm. for the Publ'n of the Rural Customs and Practices of China ed., 1958); 4
Mantetsu Surveys, at 218 (showing a similar situation in a different village).
143. ZHANG, supra note 140, at 79.
144. On England, see THE BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 140; KERRIDGE, supra note 135, at

36-37; J.V. Beckett, The PatternofLandownership in England and Wales, 1660-1880, 37 EcON. HIST.
REV. 1 (1984); and R.W. Hoyle, Tenure and the Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a Late
Contribution to the Brenner Debate, 43 ECON. HiST. REV. 1, 7-12, 17-18 (1990) (placing the start of
conscious landlord encroachment at around 1550). On Japan, see ANNE BOOTH & R. M. SUNDRUM,
LABOUR ABSORPTION IN AGRICULTURE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 145
(1985); SMITH, supra note 18; T.J. Byres, The Agrarian Question, Forms of Capitalist Agrarian
Transition and the State: An Essay with Reference to Asia, 14 SOC. SCIENTIST 3 (1986); and Saito, supra

note 136, at 173-74.
145. On the general detachment of the common law from regular socioeconomic life, see
Richard Ross, Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate over Printing English Law,

1520-1640, 146 U. PENN. L. REv. 323 (1998).
146. On the limitations of the Chinese state, see discussion surrounding infra note 156. On
Japan, see OOMS, supranote 17, at 192-242 (discussing village-level autonomy). On the evolution of the
English state and how it compares with Chinese and Japanese state capacity, see sources cited at supra
note 18.
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similarities supplies the functional comparability of something as specific as
mortgage institutions: in all three societies, mortgages, like permanent sales,
were primarily a way for smallholders to exchange land for cash in times of
financial stress. Correspondingly, they were also an important way for larger
landholders to begin the process of accumulating land, which, as discussed
below, was generally their main incentive in handing out loans.1 47 For all these
commonalities, however, the three countries diverged wildly on the specific
rules that governed mortgage redemption, indeed with enormous economic
consequences.
Section A below outlines the core characteristics of each society's
mortgage regime. It also explains the basic economic incentives and
consequences for both mortgagor and mortgagee. Section B considers possible
explanations for these institutional differences, arguing that a sociopolitical
status-based explanation is superior to conceivable alternatives.
A. Mortgage Redemption in Early Modern Societies
1.

China

'

The Qing or Republican landholder who faced some kind of pressing
financial need-assuming the need was too large to be met through unsecured
borrowing or the pawning of personal items-had two basic options. First, he
could permanently sell some of his land. Qing and Republican law recognized
and enforced land-sale contracts with automatic regularity, as did the
customary laws of virtually all rural communities. Alternatively, he could put
the land up for a dian sale, which was basically the Chinese equivalent of a
classic common law mortgage. Under this arrangement, the landholder
conveyed land usage rights to a creditor in exchange for sixty to eighty percent
of the land's full value under a permanent sale.1 48 The creditor could use the
land freely until the original landholder paid off his debt, upon which he
regained usage rights. No interest accrued on the debt, 149 which meant that the
creditor's primary incentive for issuing the loan was temporary use of the land
itself. To protect this interest, many contracts provided for a guaranteed-usage
period of one to five years, starting immediately after the signing of the dian
contract, within which the debtor was not allowed to redeem. 50
Once this period passed, however, customary law in China's core
macroregions, especially North China, the Lower Yangtze, and South China,
generally gave the debtor a valid right of redemption for, essentially, forever.' 5
As one local custom stated, dian sales "could be redeemed after several hundred
147. See discussion surrounding infra notes 170-171.
148. ZHANG, supranote 140, at 38.
149. LIANG ZHIPING ( i)
), QINGDAI XIGUAN FA: SHEHUI Yu GUOJIA ( ftWl: ±14
IE*) [QING CUSTOMARY LAW: SOCIETY AND STATE] 93 (1996); WU XIANGHONG (5[6Jl), DIAN ZHI
FENGSU Yu DIAN ZHI FALO (AZ 4
) [THE CUSTOMS AND LAWS REGULATING "DIAN"

SALl

SALES] 35 (2009).
150.

LIANG, supra note 149; Henry McAleavy, Dien in China and Vietnam, 17 J. ASIAN ST.

403, 406-7 (1958).
151. Zhang, supra note 130, at 161-63.
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years, and the price of redemption would always remain the same.",152 Under
the influence of such customs, very few dian contracts from these macroregions
attempted to establish any redemption deadline, and most dian sales were
apparently redeemed at some point, often many decades afterwards.1 53
These norms were strictly customary. In fact, government laws and
regulations enacted during the eighteenth century expressly banned dian
redemption after eleven years, largely because prolonged dian sales tended to
generate social tension and litigation.' 54 Previous surveys of local customs,
contracts, and cases demonstrate very clearly, however, that these laws and
regulations had virtually no effect on local contractual behavior.' 55 County
magistrates were severely understaffed, underfinanced, and therefore highly
reliant on the cooperation of local lineages and groups in even the most basic of
administrative tasks. 156 Therefore, when central laws contradicted local
custom, they rarely attempted to enforce the former over the latter.157
Local communities were aware of these government bans on extended
dian redemption but generally ignored them in practice. Many wealthier
landholders, especially those who had made dian purchases, repeatedly argued,
both in local courts and within their village communities, that state-mandated
redemption deadlines should take precedence over local norms of infinite
redeemability. 58 These opinions faced stiff opposition, however, from lowerincome smallholders, who insisted that the proper norm was infinite
redeemability.1 59 Historical evidence suggests that smallholders, rather than
their wealthier creditors, usually carried the day, as communal mediation
regularly enforced the right of debtors to redeem against unwilling creditors,
even many decades after the initial dian sale.160
As noted above, smallholders generally assembled their institutional
preferences regarding dian sales from the position of potential or actual debtor,
whereas wealthy households generally approached the issue as potential or
actual creditors. But why did infinite redeemability appeal so much to
debtors-and so little to creditors? The key to understanding this is to
recognize the abnormally high value of land in a predominantly agrarian

[RESEARCH
152. MINSHANGSHI XIGUAN DIAOCHA BAOGAOLU (
REPORT ON CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CUSTOMS] 505 (Sifa Xingzheng Bu ed., 1930).
153. Id. at 161, 192-93.
iRi:
154. 1 QINGDAi GE BUYUAN ZELI: QINDING HUBU ZELI (QIANLONG CHAO) (MI
VR
PRW1J(ERW1M) [REGULATIONS OF QING BOARDS AND MINISTRIES: IMPERIAL BOARD OF
FINANCE REGULATIONS (QIANLONG ERA)] 83, 148-49 (Fuchi Shuyuan ed., 2004).
155. Zhang, supra note 130, at 168-74.
156. See CH'U TUNG-TSU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 168-92 (1962);
BRADLY W. REED, TALONS AND TEETH: COUNTY CLERKS AND RUNNERS IN THE QING DYNASTY (2000)
(arguing that county magistrates were highly dependent on local clerks and runners, who in turn relied
on their familial and social ties to lubricate the daily government operations).
157. Republican governments eventually recognized the futility of enforcing the eleven-year
RRM
ban and extended the legal deadline to thirty years. ZHONGHUA MINGUO MINFA DIAN (
Ak) [CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA], arts. 912, 924 (1929).
158. ZHANG, supra note 140, at 179-83.
159. Id.
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economy.161 This meant that smallholders very rarely sold or dian sold land
unless forced to by negative circumstances. Selling or collateralizing land
under conditions of financial stress generally meant, however, that, once the
stress had passed, the seller or dian seller generally preferred to redeem the
land if possible. This usually made him prefer mortgages to permanent sales, so
long as the terms of the mortgage were not overly harsh. In fact, in virtually all
surviving Qing and Republican contract archives, dian sales outnumber
permanent sales by well over nine to one.162 Moreover, a dian seller would
usually prefer an institutional setup that maximized his chances of successful
redemption.
This is precisely what dian redemption customs did: because most dian
sales were made under considerable financial stress, it was probably not in the
seller's interest to individually negotiate redemption terms under an
institutional assumption of complete contractual freedom and flexibility. Doing
so would allow the creditor to take advantage of his difficult financial
circumstances to drive a hard bargain. Instead, he probably preferred to
establish, under more neutral conditions, an a priori redemption deadline that
covered all future dian sales in the local community. The range of options
could theoretically extend from immediately after the dian sale to infinity.
Among these, a blanket rule of infinite redeemability clearly offered the highest
probability of successful redemption.
Arguably, the only downside of this blanket rule was that, by precluding
case-by-case negotiation of redemption deadlines, it forced debtors to accept
lower dian prices, which were only sixty to eighty percent of the land's full
value. In balance, this seems like a small price to pay for maximizing one's
likelihood of redemption.163 Moreover, there were ways to negotiate higher
dian prices: the seller could simply grant a longer guaranteed-usage period,
which gave buyers greater security and larger returns, and therefore increased
their willingness to give a larger loan.' 6

161. See discussion surrounding supranotes 140-144.
162. See Yang Guozhen (%M ), Shilun Qingdai Minbei Minjian de Tudi Maimai (itifffit
Iv4N/9792JikK) [Discussing Land Transactions in Qing Northern Fujian], 1 ZHONGGUOSHI
YANJIU (± 4JE5)[A STUDY OF CHINESE HISTORY] 29, 31 (1981); CAO XINGSUI (
JIU
zHONGGUO SUNAN NONGJIA JINGJl YANJIU (1H
i
F
[RESEARCH ON THE RURAL
ECONOMY OF SOUTHERN JIANGSU IN OLD CHINA] 31 (1996); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT
FAMILY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE YANGZI DELTA , 1350-1988, at 106 (1990); QINGDAI
NINGBO QIYUE WENSHU JIJIAO ([C
) [QING CONTRACTS FROM NINGBO] (Wang

Wanying ed., 2008); 3 SHICANG QIYUE (H-1Wi

J) [Shicang Contracts] (Cao Shuji ed., 2010).

163. Implicit in this statement is, of course, an assumption that the utility value of land to a
farmer was so high that a measurable increase in the likelihood of redemption generated an expected
utility gain that outweighed the corresponding dip in dian prices. Considering that, even with infinite
redeemability, dian prices remained at sixty to eighty percent of full market value, this seems to be an
acceptable assumption.
164. The only hypothetical dian sellers who really lost out under the Chinese customary regime
were those who were completely certain that they could repay within a very short period of time, but
also urgently needed to obtain a loan worth significantly more than the percentage of full market value
commonly issued by dian buyers. Such people were, in all likelihood, extremely rare in real life. In fact,
they never emerge at all in previous studies on this subject. Presumably, if a potential dian seller was
completely and predictably able to repay within a short period of time, he very rarely would have needed
to make the sale in the first place.
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All things considered, dian redemption customs were highly protective of
the economic interests of debtors. In fact, they did so with such success that,
while English and Japanese smallholders both lost considerable ground to
larger farms during their respective early modem histories, 65 Chinese
smallholders managed to retain a largely stable share of arable land. During the
Late Qing and Republic, for example, the share of land owned by the top ten
percent of landholders in North China and the Lower Yangtze remained
between thirty-five to fifty percent, with some prolonged periods of actual
decline. Of this thirty-five to fifty percent, they directly managed only onethird.166 There are many reasons for this, but as previous scholarship has
argued, the highly debtor-friendly nature of dian customs was certainly among
the most important. 167
At the same time, these customs imposed serious inconvenience on
creditors. Once the guaranteed-usage period expired, creditors could lose their
usage rights in any year, which discouraged them from making long-term
investments in the land.168 The tremendous attractiveness of dian customs to
potential land sellers also drained the supply of permanent land sales, as
evidenced by the virtual nonexistence of permanent sale contracts in many
existing contract archives.169 Not only was accumulating land via dian sales
economically under-productive, but doing so also exacerbated the difficulty of
productive permanent accumulation.
One has to wonder why, under these conditions, dian buyers were still
willing to issue loans equal to some sixty to eighty percent of the land's full
permanent sale value. There are several possible explanations. First, despite the
inconveniences they caused, dian sales still offered significant economic value
to buyers. Even if the seller eventually redeemed, the buyer would at least have
enjoyed free use of the land for several years. Such use was, as noted above,
usually suboptimal, but even so, land productivity on dian-sold land could
reach some eighty percent of productivity on permanently owned land.1 70 A
series of dian purchases was therefore only moderately less productive
agriculturally than a permanent purchase of comparable physical size. Second,
the combination of population growth, commercialization, and pre-industrial
technological innovation during this era tended to boost land prices and
At the same time, the economic
intensify demand for land accumulation.
165. See sources cited supra note 144.
166. ZHANG, supra note 140, at 174-78; Joseph W. Esherick, Number Games: A Note on Land
Distributionin PrerevolutionaryChina, 7 MODERN CHINA 387, 391, 405 (1981); LI WENZHI(?fZ ),
[THE
MINGQING SHIDAi FENGJIAN TUDI GUANXI DE SONGJIE (
LOOSENING OF FEUDAL LAND RELATIONS IN THE MING AND QING] 58 (2007); Ramon Myers, Land
Distributionin Revolutionary China, 8 THE CHUNG CHI J. 62 (1969).
167. Zhang, supra note 130.
168. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Cost of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China
(Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 441, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid

=1953207.
169. See Zhang, supra note 130, at 187-94.
170. NAGANO AKIRA, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHIDU DE YANJIU [RESEARCH ON CHINA'S LAND
INSTITUTIONS] 116-28 (Qiang Wo trans., 2004).
171. Land prices rose between 1650 and 1835, and between 1860 and 1930 as well, further
Lun Yapian Zhanzheng
decreasing the economic risk involved. For 1650-1835, see Li Wenzhi (410),
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predominance of agriculture generally meant that wealthier households had few
alternative investment opportunities: most often, they could either let their
money sit idly or acquire land, through any means possible.
Still, it is very easy to understand, given the above analysis, why dian
sellers were often unhappy with the idea of infinite redeemability, and indeed
frequently argued against it. They truly would have benefitted from some kind
of limit on redemption: not only would this have limited the period of
uncertainty, but more importantly, it would have generated a larger likelihood
of dian default, thus boosting the supply of permanent land transactions.
Theoretically, the shorter the redemption window, the greater these benefits
would have been. In other words, the economic preferences of creditors directly
contradicted those of debtors. It is hardly surprising, then, that dian redemption
norms were a major source of social tension.
What is much more surprising is that, throughout the Qing and Republic,
customary law in China's core macroregions consistently and almost uniformly
sided with relatively impoverished debtors over their far more affluent
creditors.172 It becomes even more striking when we place the institutional
"victory" of Chinese smallholders in a comparative context: smallholders in
England and Japan consistently and almost uniformly had to settle for mortgage
institutions that were far less favorable, and far more conducive to the
economic interests of land-accumulating creditors.
2.

England

From late medieval times onwards, mortgage redemption norms in
England slowly moved against the economic interests of smallholders until, by
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they placed debtors under such
enormous economic pressure that many cash-strapped smallholders chose to
forego the mortgage option and simply sell their land. This was, naturally, a
welcome development for wealthier landholders, most of whom were
Ifilfff7793E ) [On Land Pricesand Purchase Years Before
the Opium War], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI JINGJI SHI YANJIU (EP [
[STUD. OF Soc. & ECON.
HIST.] 1 (1988). On Lower Yangtze land values, see BERNHARDT, supra note 134, at 248-49. After the
mid-nineteenth century, exposure to foreign trade further boosted market integration levels. See, e.g.,
THOMAS G. RAWSKI, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PREWAR CHINA (1989) (attributing early-twentieth century
growth to market integration driven by the foreign presence); LILLIAN M. LI, CHINA'S SILK TRADE:
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY IN THE MODERN WORLD, 1842-1937 (1981) (positively assessing the impact of
foreign trade on silk production); ROBERT PAUL GARDELLA, HARVESTING MOUNTAINS: FUJIAN AND
THE CHINA TEA TRADE, 1757-1937 (1994) (discussing the growth of the tea trade after the mid-Qing).
On growing land productivity, see Philip C.C. Huang, Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century
Britainand China?, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 501, 512 (2002) (arguing that land productivity increased despite
declining labor productivity). On increasing pressure from landlords to increase rent-levels throughout
the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see BERNHARDT, supra note 134.
172. This is, especially if one adheres to a Marxist view of history, a highly counterintuitive
outcome. The notion that primitive accumulation of capital in early modem societies generally occurred
via the dispossession and exploitation of smallholders is a central argument of Marxist historiography.
See KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL, ch. 31 (1867), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-cl/htm
(last visited Dec. 7, 2010). These ideas continue to be influential in modem political economics. See,
e.g., MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF CAPITALISM: CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE
SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 2-5 (2000) (acknowledging primitive accumulation's
role in the creation of capitalism but arguing that it displaced peasants); DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW
IMPERIALISM, 145-46, 149 (2003) (discussing accumulation by dispossession).
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accumulating large "capitalist" farms that relied primarily on hired labor.
Correspondingly, the percentage of English farmland that fell under capitalist
management rose from only a fraction of total arable land in the early fifteenth
century to well over half by the end of the sixteenth. 173
The "classic mortgage" of sixteenth and seventeenth century England was
a blunter instrument than modem Anglo-American mortgages. During that era,
"mortgages" referred to "any arrangement whereby a loan was secured by a
conveyance of real property."l 74 The debtor, or mortgagor, transferred either
full title or a long term-of-years to the creditor, on the condition that the
transfer would revert upon repayment of debt. If the mortgagor defaulted,
however, he lost his right of redemption.
There are several major differences between this arrangement and modem
mortgages. First, the great majority of modem mortgages do not convey title to
the creditor, but merely the right to be repaid from a foreclosure procedure.175
In addition, they often allow repayment schedules of up to several decades,
generally permit the mortgagor to maintain possession of the property and, in
cases of default, arrange foreclosure auctions to raise the collateral's full
market value.176 The classic mortgage was not nearly as lenient to mortgagors.
Mortgagees were allowed to possess the land while waiting for repayment,177
but, more importantly, local customs generally dictated that mortgagors must
redeem within, most often, six months to a year, or go into default, upon which
the mortgagee would obtain full, unburdened ownership without any additional
payment. 178
Until the early eighteenth century, most English courts-common law
courts, manor and borough courts, and so on-enforced these customary
deadlines quite ruthlessly. They were such a major source of social tension that
Chancery eventually felt compelled to aid beleaguered mortgagors by
establishing "the equity of redemption," allowing judges to extend redemption
deadlines and demand foreclosure auctions upon final default. 179 These
reforms did not, however, harden into established doctrine until the early
eighteenth century, and even then, their dominance over harsher common law
rules was questionable. 80
All in all, compared to his counterparts in Qing and Republican China,
173. See Shaw-Taylor, supra note 131, at 4, 17-18; ALLEN, supra note 131, at 73, 78-104
(1992); Hipkin, supra note 131; Daniel Grigg, Farm size in England and Wales, from early Victorian
times to the present, 35 AGRIC. HIST. R. 179, 188-89 (1987). See generally R.H. TAWNEY, THE
AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1912); THE BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 140.
174. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 353 (3d ed. 1990).
175. This is the rule under all "lien theory" jurisdictions, which covers England and most
American states. DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 7 (2004).

176. Id.
177. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 157-58 (Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1979); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 242-43 (2d ed. 1986).

178. Zhang, supra note 130, at 182-86.
179. David Sugarman & Ronnie Warrington, Land Law, Citizenship, and the Invention of
"Englishness": The Strange World of the Equity of Redemption, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY 111, 113 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995).

&

180. See Burgess v. Wheate (1759), 96 Eng. Rep. 67, 1 Black. W. 123 (K.B.); Sugarman
Warrington, supra note 179, at 117.
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the early modem English smallholder who needed to raise large sums of cash
was clearly in much direr straights: the short and harshly enforced redemption
deadlines imposed by customary law meant that he was under serious danger of
quickly losing his collateral for less than full market value. Much of the time,
he was actually better off selling the land outright, which would at least leave
him with a larger sum of money. What is even more striking about the SinoEnglish comparison is that, while Chinese dian redemption norms remained
largely stable throughout the Qing and Republic, English mortgage institutions
became progressively harsher towards debtors over time. During the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, laws and customs still acknowledged the existence of
vivum vadium ("living gages")-an archaic predecessor to mortgages-in
which the debtor did not face any fixed deadline to redeem.
Rather, the
creditor would assume possession of the collateral, and some of the yearly
produce it generated would count towards the initial debt. By the fifteenth
century, however, this debtor-friendly instrument had been almost completely
replaced by "mortgages" that required repayment within a very short tenn.1 82
The saving grace was that many local customs still guaranteed the defaulting
debtor a foreclosure sale, so that he might at least recoup the full market value
of the collateral. 183 The debtor's institutional position deteriorated further,
however, during the sixteenth century, when the foreclosure sale was gradually
replaced by automatic full conveyance to the creditor upon default.
The deterioration of debtor-protection in mortgage was but one part of a
broader trend in early modem English property law. During the sixteenth
century and later, smallholders clashed often and severely with large
landowners over rent and fee increases, evictions, and unilateral enclosures, but
generally lost out in the end.185 Especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the wide array of legal reforms that wealthy households pushed
through clashed intensely with what lower-income households considered
normatively appropriate.'8 Even after 1700, when enclosures had become so
commonplace that they were no longer a major source of tension, higherincome households continued to pressure lower-income ones over issues such
as gleaning rights.187 Scholars therefore regularly portray the evolution of

181. RANULF DE GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE
X.8 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965); H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1890).
182. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 158 (Univ. of

Chicago Press 1979).
183. Zhang, supra note 130, at 184-85.
184. Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 179, at 113 (discussing the consequences of default
prior to the rise of the equity of redemption).
185. See THE BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 140, at 30; KERRIDGE, supra note 135; Hoyle,
supra note 144.
186. THE BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 140, at 35; KERRIDGE, supra note 135; Hoyle, supra
note 144; R.W. Hoyle, An Ancient and Laudable Custom: The Definition and Development of Tenant
Right in North-Western England in the Sixteenth Century, 116 PAST & PRESENT 24, 29-36 (1987)
(portraying the evolution of tenant right as tensioned bargaining between lord and tenant).
187. Gleaning rights are customary rights given to the poor to collect leftover crops from
farmers' fields after they have been commercially harvested. Peter King, Legal Change, Customary
Right, and Social Conflict in Late Eighteenth-CenturyEngland: The Origins ofthe Great Gleaning Case

of 1788, 10 LAW & HIST. REV. I (1992).
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English property institutions in this era as one driven by strong self-interested
utilitarianism, if not outright class conflict.'8 Wealth-based social tension and
conflict played a major role, therefore, in the negotiation of both early modem
Chinese and English property institutions. But while English smallholders
emerged from these conflicts much weakened both institutionally and
economically, Chinese smallholders somehow achieved the opposite.
3.

Japan

At a cursory glance, virtually all transactions on Tokugawa land markets
were mortgages. This was because, as noted above, the Tokugawa state
formally outlawed permanent selling of land, which forced landowners to
disguise sales as ten-year mortgages (zyunenki shichichi nagare) that would not
be redeemed and would convey full ownership to the creditor upon default.189
Village communities and local officials recognized the difference between such
in-name-only mortgages and "real" mortgages that carried a possibility of
redemption.1 90 Beyond these formalities, Japanese smallholders in need of
large sums of cash faced essentially the same options as their Chinese or
English peers: either sell land or collateralize it.
"Real" mortgages came in two forms: kakiire, in which the debtor
retained control of the land, and shichiire, in which the creditor assumed
control until redemption.1 91 Some villages only recognized one of the two, but
most seemed to allow both.1 92 Most often, land collateralized under both
arrangements would forfeit completely to the creditor upon default. 193
Alternatively, some villages allowed officials to hold a foreclosure sale, which
at least allowed the debtor to recoup the land's full market value.1 94
Redemption deadlines could vary depending on the district. The most
common custom was a uniform ten-year deadline that triggered automatic full
conveyance to the creditor upon default. 195 Other districts or villages
recognized shorter deadlines, ranging from twenty-two months to seven
years,196 and a few allowed the debtor as much as twenty years to repay.197
Not only did redemption deadlines vary from district from district, but they also
fluctuated within individual districts. In Hanishina District, Shinano Province,

188. Such portrayals are also seen in, for example, Rab Houston, Custom in Context: Medieval
and Early Modern Scotland and England, 211 PAST & PRESENT 35 (2011); and Andy Wood, The Place

of Custom in PlebeianPoliticalCulture. England, 1550-1800, 22 Soc. HIST. 46 (1997).
189. 2 LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 11 (John Henry Wigmore ed., 1967).
190. GRACE H. KWON, STATE FORMATION, PROPERTY RELATIONS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE TOKUGAWA ECONOMY (1600-1868), at 64-65 (2002); Frank G. Bennett Jr., Getting Property Right:
"Informal" Mortgages in the JapaneseCourts, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 463, 468-70 (2009).
191. 2 LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN, supra note 189, at 79 (discussing differences
between kakiire mortgages, which the editor calls "hypothecs," and shichiire mortgages, which he calls

"pledges").
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 79.
Id. at 82, 91.
Id. at 80, 86.
Id. at 80, 91, 94, 96.
Id. at 85-86, 88, 89, 91.
Id. at 83-84, 94.
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for example, local customs were renegotiated quite often, and went from ten
years before the mid-eighteenth century to five to ten years in the late
eighteenth, to three to five by the mid-nineteenth. 198
Only in a few districts do we find anything resembling Chinese dian
redemption rules, where debtors could redeem "at any time, no matter how long
after the pledge was made."
Even in these districts, Japanese debtors were
still worse off than their Chinese counterparts, simply because virtually all
Japanese mortgages carried interest. Interest rates were not a major concern
during the early Tokugawa but increased sharply from the mid-eighteenth
century onwards, so much that historians have often considered them a major
source of social tension in the later Tokugawa. 20
Japanese mortgage redemption and default rules came, therefore, in a
variety of shapes and sizes, but coalesced primarily around a model that was,
effectively, a moderately more humane-to debtors-version of English
customs. At one extreme were the districts that only gave debtors twenty-two
months to repay and provided no foreclosure sale upon default. Others gave
longer redemption windows, usually ten years, and a minority of these districts
provided. the financial security of a foreclosure sale. There was also the
occasional twenty-year deadline and a few localities that guaranteed infinite
redeemability. Correspondingly, although "real" mortgages were quite plentiful
on the Japanese land market, they did not crowd out permanent sales like they
did in China. 201 The combination of permanent sales and mortgage
foreclosures allowed wealthier Japanese farmers to accumulate a much larger
share of arable land during the mid to late Tokugawa-but apparently at a
slower pace than their English counterparts-and drive large numbers of
smallholders into wage labor. 202
Both the cross-regional variation of redemption deadlines and their
fluctuation within single villages across time suggest that they were the product
of regular reexamination and renegotiation. Unsurprisingly, these were often
rich versus poor affairs, to the point where government officials came to
consider land concentration and the institutional conflicts it provoked perhaps
the major source of social tension during the later Tokugawa.203 Japanese
smallholders did not always fare that badly in these negotiations, especially
when compared to the plight of English smallholders, but, as the case of
Hanishina District suggests, they nonetheless tended to lose ground over time.

198. Id. at 85-86.
199. Id. at 87, 93.
200. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 157-200; STEPHEN VLASTOS, PEASANT PROTESTS AND
UPRISINGS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 156-67 (1986); HERBERT Bix, PEASANT PROTEST IN JAPAN, 15901884 (1986); JAMES W. WHITE, IKKI: SOCIAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL PROTEST IN EARLY MODERN
JAPAN (1977); HUGH BORTON, PEASANT UPRISINGS IN JAPAN OF THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD (1938).
201. See RAMSEYER, supra note 19, at 23-27; Saito, supranote 136; KWON, supra note 190, at
86; SMITH,supra note 17, at 157-61.
202. On the gradual decline of smallholding, see KWON, supra note 190, at 55-73; and SMITH,
supra note 17, at 124-56. Nonetheless, the pace of change described in these studies seems to be more
drawn out and less dramatic than the rapid ascension of managerial farming in the seventeenth century
England. See sources cited supranote 131.
203. See sources cited supra note 200.
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B. ExplainingInstitutionalDivergence
To summarize, early modem Chinese smallholders were significantly
more successful than Japanese smallholders-and vastly more successful than
English ones-at securing favorable mortgage institutions. The economic
consequences of this institutional divergence were immense. At around two
centuries prior to large-scale industrialization, smallholder farmers were the
dominant force in all three economies, both population-wise and output-wise,
but only in China were they able to retain that position until the eve of
industrialization.
The broad socioeconomic similarities between these societies discussed at
the beginning of this Part severely curtail the range of plausible explanations.
One might be tempted to suggest, for example, that wealthier Chinese
landholders simply cared less about accumulating land than their English and
Japanese counterparts, and were therefore more willing to compromise on
mortgage institutions, but this is almost certainly untrue. Local Chinese court
archives are well-stocked with cases in which large landholders begged
government officials to override "backwards" or "evil" dian redemption
customs by applying regulatory redemption deadlines. 204 Republican era
village surveys, too, present no shortage of such complaints. 205 If anything, we
may have more evidence that large landholders held very strong opinions on
mortgage redemption from China than from either England or Japan.
If we consider the powerful economic incentives that drove Chinese
landholders towards aggregating large farms, it seems extremely unlikely that
they would have "cared less" about land accumulation than their English or
Japanese peers. By some estimates, labor productivity was more than twenty
percent higher on large, managerial farms than on household-sized plots in
North China and the Lower Yangtze, and the gap in animal productivity was
similarly large. 206 In fact, the historical record strongly suggests that
managerial farms failed to assume greater importance in the rural Chinese
economy only because unlimited dian redemption made them exceedingly hard
to assemble. 207

Similarly, there is no reason to believe that Japanese or English
smallholders had any less incentive than Chinese smallholders to fight for
favorable mortgage redemption norms. In fact, historians have never described
the creation of large farms in England and Japan as anything but a highly
coercive process. The loss of land in both societies meant the loss of long-term
livelihood and entrance into a volatile and relatively low-wage rural labor

204. See ZHANG, supra note 140, at 70, 202-17.
205. Id.
206. See JOHN LOSSING BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION IN CHINA: A STUDY OF 16,786 FARMS IN
168 LOCALITIES, AND 38,256 FARM FAMILIES IN TWENTY-TWO PROVINCES IN CHINA, 1929-1933, at

273, 276 (1937) [hereinafter BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION]; BUCK, supra note 114, at 47, 53; Kenneth
Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 10, 11819(2008).
207. BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION, supra note 206, at 277; see also HUANG, supra note 115, at
144-45.
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market.208 Few smallholders succumbed to such a fate without vigorous
resistance.
Ultimately, the broad-sweeping economic similarities between these
societies suggest that the cause of institutional divergence was more likely one
of sociopolitical clout than one of economic incentive: why were large Chinese
landholders unable-rather than unwilling-to impose their institutional
preferences on smallholders the way that their Japanese or English peers did?
The historical evidence strongly suggests that they simply did not have the
political influence to do so: Chinese smallholders brought more sociopolitical
chips-by occupying local positions of authority and prestige-to the
bargaining table than Japanese or English smallholders, and were therefore
more successful in securing favorable property institutions.209
Compared to Japanese, and especially to English smallholders, Chinese
smallholders generally seemed to possess far more political power. For
example, in a collection of North China village surveys from the early 1940s,
below-median landholders accounted for 63 of 128 identifiable village
leadership positions, include village chief, vice-chief, heads of smaller
administrative units, and chiefs of major local lineages.210 At least one village
chief was virtually landless.211 This pattern of status distribution also seemed
to exist in the Lower Yangtze and South China since at least the late Ming
Dynasty.212 Wealth did seem to confer some political advantage-nine of the
top thirty-five landholders in the seven North China villages had occupied a
leadership position at some point, a significantly higher percentage than what
we find in lower wealth tiers-but the advantage was modest. 213
In comparison, social histories of early modem England generally agree
that wealthy landowners enjoyed a virtual monopoly over local political
appointments. Surveys of English localities during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries have repeatedly shown that recognition as a "gentleman"
and the assumption of political authority were almost universally dependent
upon the possession of substantial landed wealth.214 Some recent studies point
out that other factors, including a consistent commitment to public service or

208. See discussion surrounding supranotes 141, 200.
209. The only real alternative explanation proposed by preexisting scholars is that Chinese rural
communities often embraced "precommercial" moral ideals of "permanency in landownership"-that is,
they believed that the permanent deprivation of land was morally wrong. See HUANG, supra note 134, at
74; MELISSA MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE
IMPERIAL CHINA 234 (1998). There is, however, virtually no evidence of such moralizing. Quite the
opposite, the fact that larger landholders were almost uniformly critical of strong dian redemption rights
argues against the existence of any moral consensus on whether permanent land alienation was
permissible. See discussion surrounding supro note 81.

210. See Zhang, supra note 15, at 203-04.
211. Id.at204.
212. See FENG ERKANG ET AL. (NW# ),ZHONGGUO ZONGZU SIl ( ±$>
) [HISTORY
OF CHINESE LINEAGES] 318-25 (2009); INOUE TOHRU, ZHONGGUO DE ZONGZU Yu GUOJIA LIZHI (Ft M
4
) [CHINA'S LINEAGES AND RITUAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE] (Hang Qian trans.,

2008).
213. See Zhang, supra note 15, at 203-04.
214. WRIGHTSON, supra note 16; French, supra note 16; E.P. Thompson, Eighteenth-Century

English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?, 3 SOc. HIST. 133 (1978).
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long-term residency in the community, also influenced one's political
stature,215 but even they continue to emphasize that significant landed wealth
was at least a prerequisite for high status. 216
Japanese smallholders, too, were largely shut out of the village political
elite, but not quite as uniformly. Previous scholarship suggests that, although
village headmen were almost always wealthy, in many-perhaps mostvillages, at least some political elites were smallholders.217 Smallholders were
therefore better "represented" politically than in the English countryside, but
not nearly as well as in China. Some of these politically recognized
smallholders were formerly rich households who managed to retain some of
their old political stature despite declining economic fortunes, but others were
"genuine" smallholders who regularly belonged to the village's economic
underclass. 218

The level of economic protection that mortgage institutions afforded
smallholders strongly correlated, therefore, to the level of sociopolitical status
the smallholders seemed to cumulatively possess. Smallholders occupied a
large share of local leadership positions in Qing and Republican China.
Correspondingly, they also enjoyed highly favorable mortgage institutions that
minimized their likelihood of permanently losing the collateral. In comparison,
English smallholders were almost entirely unrepresented among local political
elites and also faced exceedingly harsh mortgage institutions that regularly led
to undercompensated default and seizure. Japanese smallholders generally fell
in-between the two extremes in both cumulative status and mortgage
institutions.
Although correlation is not causation, previous historical research has
demonstrated that there is, in fact, much qualitative and circumstantial
evidence, especially from China and England, to suggest that a causal
relationship existed between distributions of sociopolitical status and mortgage
institutions.219 The North China rural surveys cited above contain a number of
court cases in which high political status smallholders utilized their political
position to enforce local dian customs upon unhappy landlords.220 In one such
case, a village chief of middling wealth had made a dian sale to the second
wealthiest landlord in the county, who then attempted to impose a number of
restrictions against redemption.221 The village chief argued that local customs
did not recognize these restrictions, whereas the landlord sought to persuade
judges that those customs were unconscionable. When the court declined to
issue a formal judgment, the village chief mobilized a number of lower-income
village elders to put social pressure on the landlord, who eventually relented.
Similarly, historians have long argued that the near-monopolization of
215.

French, supra note 16.

216. Id.
217. OOMS, supra note 17, at 166-91; SMITH, supra note 17, at 50-64; CHAMBLISS, supra note
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political authority by early modem English landlords allowed them to actively
reshape political institutions in ways that were beneficial to their economic
interests.222 While the classic example is the evolution of tenancy institutions
away from tenant security towards greater landlord discretion, 223 the basic
narrative is equally applicable to the gradual deterioration of debtor's rights in
mortgage institutions. Scholars have yet to examine whether, and to what
extent, the "political power drives legal change" narrative applies to the
specific history of Japanese property institutions, but in general, they have
often argued, especially in recent years, that legal change in Japan, whether
historical or contemporary, is largely driven by self-interested and
economically motivated behavior.224 All in all, differences in sociopolitical
status distribution probably go a long way towards explaining the differences
between early modem Chinese, English, and Japanese mortgage institutions. As
political economists probably would have predicted, political "might"
determined, or at least significantly influenced, institutional "right."
This is a strictly comparative explanation. Should we limit the analysis to,
for example, China, it would be much more difficult to gauge the relative
significance of political status vis-A-vis other potential explanatory factors. As
the above analysis repeatedly indicates, distributions of status operated within a
complex socioeconomic context that includes, among other factors, the relative
social stability of the Chinese countryside, the dominance of customary law
over formal law, and the commercialization of the rural economy. Any of these
factors arguably facilitated the emergence of debtor-friendly dian customs.
Apart from status distribution, however, the other factors do not really
distinguish China from England and Japan, and were therefore unlikely to have
generated institutional divergence.
But even with that qualification, status distributions alone would still be
an inadequate explanation for institutional divergence: status distributions do
not simply "exist" but are necessarily shaped and influenced by other
sociopolitical factors. A satisfactory explanation for institutional divergence
must ask why Chinese, English and Japanese distributions of sociopolitical
status differed so dramatically in the first place. This is the subject of Part IV.

IV.

FROM CULTURE TO STATUS DISTRIBUTIONS

This Part examines the first half of the "cultural norms to status
distributions to property institutions" causation chain: the (so far) theoretical
claim that status distributions had cultural origins. It makes, therefore, two
arguments. First, it argues that the status distribution differences outlined in
Part III stemmed from the different social hierarchies accepted in early modem
Chinese, English, and Japanese societiessocieties. Second, it argues that, at
least in the Chinese case, these social hierarchies were distinctly "cultural," in

222. See sources cited supra note 186.
223. Id.
224. See especially OOMS, supra note 17, at 319 ("The juridical field of Tokugawa Japan was
marked by substantive rationalism."); RAMSEYER, supra note 19; Saito, supra note 136.
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that they were the product of widespread moral internalization. Similar
arguments may also apply to England and Japan but are not explored in detail.
A. Social Norms of Status Distribution
This Section argues for the existence of well-established and fairly clear
norms of status allocation in all three societies. In other words, each society had
its own specific criteria by which sociopolitical authority and stature were
allocated. In China, age and generational seniorities were, at least nominally,
the dominant criteria, whereas English social hierarchies were largely
determined by landed wealth. Japanese villages appeared to embrace a mixture
of status determinants, including both landed wealth and hereditary lineage.
These social hierarchies not only were highly durable across time, remaining
largely stable during the early modern era, but could also possess remarkable
geographic reach. In the Chinese case, a similar set of basic status criteria was
applied across numerous macro-regions with varying ecological and economic
circumstances. These status criteria do an extremely effective job of explaining
the different patterns of sociopolitical status allocation described in Part III.
As an increasing number of scholars have come to realize, the most
obvious and prevalent source of hierarchy and inequality in early modem
Chinese society-apart from the systemic patriarchal gender inequalities that
existed in virtually every major early modem ysociety 225-was the social,
political and legal dominance of elder generations over their younger
kinsmen.226 Virtually all sources of legal or quasi-legal regulation in Qing
society, including legal codes, government regulations, local customs, or
lineage codes of conduct, recognized systematic inequalities between different
family members:227 parents occupied a higher socio-legal position than their
offspring, as did uncles over nephews, and elder brothers or cousins over
younger ones. Elder members of the household therefore dominated
socioeconomic decision making.228 Mere disobedience or rudeness to a senior
relative was a punishable offense. Normatively, wealth did not affect status
differences within kinship groups. A wealthy nephew owed the same socio-

225. Women, particularly senior women, could wield significant influence over household
decision making. However, beyond the household, their status largely depended on the status of their
k) [THE
ZHONGGUO JIAZU FA YUANLI (t RA8R
household patriarch. SHIGA SHUZO (A
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW IN CHINA] 109-10 (Zhang Jianguo & Li Li trans., Falti Press 2003). In fact,
the sociopolitical position of women in China seemed to decline from the medieval era (circa 900 A.D.)
to the Ming and Qing dynasties, a process that was paralleled in England, and possibly in Japan as well.
KATHRYN BERNHARDT, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN CHINA 960-1949 (1999); SARA MENDELSON
PATRICIA CRAWFORD, WOMEN IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: 1550-1720 (1990); Yukata Yabuta,
Rediscovering Women in Tokugawa Japan, http://rijs.fas.harvard.edu/pdfs/yabuta.pdf (last visited Mar.
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Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 915, 931 (1986); Avner Greif & Guido Tabellini,
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TO COMPARATIVE LAW 257, 263-64 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
227. See ZHANG, supra note 140, at 113-35; 8 ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI (l$fM%)
[HISTORY OF LAW IN CHINA, hereinafter TONGSHI] 208, 256-57, 508 (Zhang Jinfan ed., 1999).
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legal obligations to a penniless uncle as a penniless nephew to a wealthy one.
These kinship hierarchies retained much of their vitality even after the Qing
state's collapse. Republican legal codes narrowed the range of privileges
afforded to senior relatives, but continued to recognize many of them.229 More
importantly, the great majority of local communities continued to enforce
traditional kinship hierarchies throughout the Republican era, and many do so
even today. 230

This meant that sociopolitical status in these "core" Chinese
macroregions should, in theory, have correlated strongly with two factors: first,
membership in a large kinship group and, second, generational and age-based
seniority. While most local communities seemed to recognize a general
gerontocratic principle that elders deserved respect and deference, elder
relatives almost always commanded greater respect and deference than elder
non-relatives. The highest status individuals in any given village should
therefore have been the senior members of large kinship networks, especially
those large and consolidated enough to constitute a major economic and
political force. Such kinship networks did, in fact, exist in the vast majority of
Chinese villages. 231

Strong status correlation with seniority generally meant weak correlation
with wealth. This was simply because the life expectancy of wealthy
households in early modem rural China was not significantly longer than that
of middling or even lower-income ones. 232 Smallholder households had only a
moderately smaller chance of producing a high seniority individual than their
wealthier neighbors. A true gerontocracy should therefore have produced a
class of political elites that was well-stocked with low-income but highseniority individuals.
These conjectures are largely borne out by historical evidence. In the
North China surveys cited above, not only did political leadership correlate

.
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weakly with wealth, but it also correlated extremely strongly with generational
seniority in a major local lineage. At least 108 of the 128 individuals belonged
to the most senior generation of what villagers identified as a "major kinship
group."233 Only nine people clearly belonged to a younger generation, whereas

the generational standing of the other eleven are unclear.234 Similarly, existing
Qing and Republican lineage regulations from the Lower Yangtze almost
uniformly listed seniority among the most important selection criteria for
internal leadership positions. Most regulations simply identified it as the most
important criteria.235 Equally significantly, a large portion of these regulations
236
expressly denounced selecting leaders based on wealth.
The early modem English countryside embraced a very different set of
status criteria. As noted above, the dominant criteria for higher sociopolitical
status was actually landed wealth itself

237

When and how this norm became

social entrenched is somewhat unclear. To some extent, it was buttressed by
sociopolitical reorganization after the Black Death,238 although significant
wealth-based stratification certainly predated the Black Death.239 In any case,
it was not until the early modem era that the link between status and wealth
became ironclad.
Japanese status criteria resembled English ones to some extent. In most
Tokugawa villages, there was apparently both a general norm that political
leadership positions were hereditary and a widely held belief that they should
be held by relatively wealthy individuals.240 Correspondingly, when state
vassals initially assigned village headmen and granted "titled peasant" statuswhich provided the status-holder a formal voice in village politics-in the early
Tokugawa, they almost uniformly gave these positions to the wealthiest men in
the village under the assumption that the positions would be hereditary. 241In
theory, the official ban against permanent land alienation meant that the relative
wealth of households would change relatively little over time, and therefore
that political authority could be both hereditary and wealth-based. Lineages
were important in Japanese social life but also appeared to select their leaders
based on a mixture of wealth and inheritance considerations, rather than by
seniority.
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As discussed above, however, the ban against land alienation was swiftly
circumvented in actual commercial practice, which led to the constant
reshuffling of relative household wealth. Over time, and especially by the midTokugawa, traditional headmen and titled-peasant households often lost their
economic prominence to previously middling or even lower-income
households. 243 Consequently, while these traditional political elite were
sometimes able to retain some authority by virtue of their hereditary position,
they were also under regular pressure by "nouveau riche" households to share
that authority.
The struggle by these newly economically prominent households to gain
political status tended to be moderately successful. With some effort, they often
acquired positions among the village elite, sometimes at the expense of elite
households who had fallen on very hard times, but more often simply by
expanding the ranks of the political elite.244 Nonetheless, this was truly a
struggle, and demanded skillful political maneuvering and coalition-building.
This came in the form of alliances between newly rich households, but also
through alliances between these households and smallholder or even landless
households.245
The result of all this was that, while Tokugawa village politics were
largely a rich-dominated affair, they were also one in which poor households
played some substantial role. The semi-hereditary nature of political stature
meant that formerly rich households often possessed high status despite severe
declines in economic fortunes. In addition, the political calculations of newly
rich households also led to the political ascension of some "true" smallholder
households under their patronage. Smallholders were, therefore, usually far less
numerous within the village council than large landholders, and often of lower
status, but could nonetheless occupy some share of political authority.
To summarize, the distributions of sociopolitical status in early modem
Chinese, English and Japanese villages were almost exactly what their status
distribution norms and criteria would have predicted. Seniority-based kinship
hierarchies in rural China led to gerontocracies in which senior smallholders
were very well represented. The landholding prerequisites for high political
status in England effectively allowed large landholders to monopolize formal
sociopolitical authority. Finally, the mixture of wealth-based and hereditary
status criteria in Japanese villages led to a weaker form sociopolitical
dominance-but still dominance-by large landholders than in the English
countryside. One can cite, once again, the "correlation is not causation" maxim,
but when the stated status criteria correlate so well with actual status
distributions, the burden must be on potential skeptics to identify plausible
alternative explanations.

lineages, Japanese lineages were less concerned with blood ties and generational seniority, and more
concerned with maintenance of the lineage's economic assets).
243. OOMS,supra note 17, at 81-82, 125-91; SMITH,supra note 17, at 50-64; PRATT,supra note
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The only alternative explanation that has drawn any serious academic
attention is the theory that rice-growing regions tend to have a different social
culture than wheat-growing ones: rice agriculture, due to its extremely high
labor intensity during seeding and irrigation, is often more collaborative than
wheat agriculture, which may incentivize rich households in rice-growing
regions to treat their poorer neighbors more deferentially than they would in
wheat-growing regions. 246
Nonetheless, this theory completely fails to explain the specific
comparisons illustrated in this Article. North China and the Lower Yangtze had
far more in common than the Lower Yangtze had with Japan, despite the fact
that North China was a wheat-growing region, whereas the other two were ricegrowing regions. In general, smallholders had much higher cumulative
sociopolitical status in North China than they did in Japan, which is the
opposite of what the rice-wheat distinction would predict. Moreover, Northern
Chinese social hierarchies had almost nothing in common with English ones,
despite both being wheat-growing economies. It is far more likely that the
sociopolitical strength of smallholders in North China and the Lower Yangtze
derived from the seniority-based kinship hierarchies that dominated local
society in both macroregions.
But why did Chinese communities embrace these gerontocratic"Confucian," if you will-kinship hierarchies in the first place? The following
Section argues that the primary driving force was, to quote Ellickson, "the
internalization of culture." 247 Whether the same was true for English and
Japanese status allocation norms is less clear, but at least one prong of the
three-pronged institutional comparison made in this Article had distinctly
"cultural" foundations.
B. CulturalInternalizationand Chinese Kinship Hierarchies
This Section considers how "Confucian" kinship hierarchies came to be
embedded in Chinese society in the first place. It argues that they were at least
partially the product of widespread moral internalization by the Chinese
population. By and large, this claim is uncontroversial among historians. The
Mainland Chinese historian Feng Erkang probably speaks for many when he
states that Qing society adhered "piously" to the "collectivist" ideal that "one
should make their ancestors proud" by closely adhering to Confucian moral
values. 248 The problem is that these are, to the critical academic eye,
JINDAI JIANONAN XIANGCUN DIQUAN DE LISHI
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assumptions, and will probably fail to satisfy social scientists who adhere more
to a rational-choice view of social institutions. This Article, however, presents a
systematic argument-the first of its kind-for the widespread internalization
of kinship hierarchies.
There are three possible explanations for the social dominance of kinship
hierarchies in Qing and Republican China. Two are largely "functionalist" or
utilitarian, in that they focus on the pragmatic utility of kinship hierarchies,
both to individuals and groups. First, they conveyed substantial sociopolitical
or economic benefits on those who self-organized into kinship networks, and
therefore spread and were sustained "organically" from the bottom up. Second,
they were encouraged as a matter of state policy. The third, non-functionalist
possibility is that kinship hierarchies were morally internalized on a large scale,
and therefore spread simply because people believed that they were a morally
desirable or "natural" means of social organization.
Common sense suggests that all three mechanisms probably coexisted to
some extent. The more pertinent and far more difficult question is whether any
of them were necessary conditions for the social dominance of kinship
hierarchies. This is best answered through examining the longue durde history
of kinship hierarchies. By the Qing and Republic, the social dominance of
"Confucian" kinship hierarchies was stable and rarely challenged.249 For the
purposes of this Section, however, the more significant question is how they
became dominant in the first place, which can only be answered by studying
earlier eras-as early as the eleventh century-when kinship networks were
still emerging and spreading.
The following Subsections evaluate the three major potential
explanations-bottom-up
socioeconomic
demand, top-down political
incentivizing, and widespread cultural internalization-one-by-one, ultimately
arguing that the basic historical chronology of kinship hierarchies is, in all
likelihood, inexplicable if widespread cultural internalization did not exist.
1. "Bottom-Up" Socioeconomic Demand
Few would question that bottom-up socioeconomic demand played a
crucial role. In the end, the decision to form kinship networks had to be made
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and executed-willingly-by local communities and households, not by
increasingly remote central policyrnakers, and not by the moralistic urgings of
Confucian scholars. The more challenging question is to what extent the latter
two factors affected that decision, whether by shaping economic and political
incentives, or by imposing a sense of moral propriety.
Historians generally agree that, prior to the Song Dynasty, the great
majority of large, organized kinship networks belonged to major aristocratic
houses who dominated the central government and resided in major urban
centers.250 It was not until the tenth or eleventh centuries that they began to
trickle down, with limited and somewhat reluctant government approval,251
into the general population. Private lineage-formation seemed to speed up
during the twelvth century in both North China and the Lower Yangtze, and
then again after the Mongol occupation ended in the fourteenth century.252 By
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, expansive kinship hierarchies were highly
prevalent in North China and the Lower Yangtze and had begun to emerge en
masse in South China as well.253 By at least the early eighteenth century, they
were a cornerstone of social life in virtually all core Chinese macroregions.254
During the Northern Song, a substantial share of lineages were created by
new generations of high-level degree holders and officials who hoped to
enshrine their historical legacy through lineage creation, but as time passed,
kinship networks became more "plebian" in origin.255 The percentage of the
population that held high-level degrees plunged after the Song, and then
plunged again from the Ming to the Qing.256 At the same time, organized
kinship networks were spreading rapidly across the country. Inevitably, a
significant majority of these kinship networks had to operate without any
substantive ties to ajinshi degree-holder, or even ajuren.
Correspondingly, rationales for creating kinship networks tended to
"descend" from enshrining one's historical legacy to more straightforward
calculations of socioeconomic utility. In any macroregion, self-organizing into
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large kinship networks conveyed some fairly obvious and significant
advantages: resource sharing, labor pooling, better information sharing, and a
stronger capacity for collective action-all leading to higher economic
productivity, more orderly social life within the group, and stronger responses
to external challenges. 257 In particular, once a few established kinship
networks had emerged in a region, the pressure intensified on other households
to form their own kinship networks, or else be at a considerable disadvantage in
all dimensions of social and economic life.258
But while socioeconomic utility may explain the emergence and
proliferation of kinship networks, it cannot explain why, by at least the later
Ming, most of them had adopted an internal hierarchy based primarily on age
and generational seniority.259 Utilitarian considerations actually seem to urge
against adopting such hierarchies. Seniority-based hierarchies are so deeply
non-meritocratic that their material functionality is highly questionable. While
one may quibble about whether age and experience often lead to wisdom, the
unavoidable fact is that there were vastly more effective ways of putting the
most capable, however defined, people in charge. Educational level, economic
success, popular support, and moral reputation-any of these would have been
a more reasonable proxy for leadership qualities than age or patrilineal
proximity. There are, in fact, many signs that some kinship networks were
seriously concerned about the amount of meritocracy within their internal
governance structures. Many, if not most, kinship networks gave exalted status
to people who held juren or jinshi degrees.260 Others expressed a preference
for leaders who "possessed a good reputation among relatives," or were
"known for good sense and integrity."261
Neither of these mechanisms, however, did much to challenge
straightforward ranking by age and generation over the long run. After the
Ming, and especially during the Qing, higher-level degrees were extraordinarily
262
hard to come by.
Consequently, at any given time, the great majority of
kinship networks possessed no living juren or jinshi. Considerations of social
reputation, on the other hand, were generally subsumed within the age
hierarchy and only used, if at all, to differentiate between people of comparable

257. FAURE, supra note 248; SzoNYI, supra note 253.
258. NG CHrN-KEONG, TRADE AND SOCIETY: THE AMOY NETWORK ON THE CHINA COAST,

1683-1735, at 31 (1983).

259. FENG, supra note 230, at 95-96, 111-13, 248-56; ZHU YONG (*
), QINGDAI ZONGFA
YANJIU (t
f
U)
[STUDIES ON LINEAGE RITUALS IN THE QING] (1987).
260. CH'U, supra note 157, at 168-80.
261. E.g., NANJIN JIANGSHI MINFANG FAXIANG PU (1F#
) [FAMILY TREE OF
SOUTHERN JIN JIANG FAMILY MINFANG] (1890) (on file with author); SIMING ZHUSHI ZHIPU (q11
3EW) [FAMILY TREE OF SIMING ZHU FAMILY] (1936) (on file with author); YAONAN DINGSHAN
FANGSHI ZONGPU (
[FAMILY TREE OF YAONAN DINGSHAN FANG FAMILY] (1921)
(on file with author); YONGSHANG TUSHI ZONGPU ($fi±_T
) [FAMILY TREE OF YONGSHANG TU
FAMILY] (1919) (on file with author); BIANSHI ZONGPU (It
iAe) [FAMILY TREE OF BIAN FAMILY]
(1874) (on file with author).
262. Elman, supra note 256, at 14-15; MATTHEW H. SOMMER, SEX, LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE
IMPERIAL CHINA 8 (2000) ("By the eighteenth century, all but a tiny percentage of the population could
be considered free commoners.").
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seniority.263 However we look at it, Chinese kinship networks usually were
organized around predominantly non-meritocratic principles.
Of course, meritocracy is not always equivalent to socioeconomic
efficiency. There are a number of potentially overriding concerns, especially
political stability and the cost of leadership transitions. Pure meritocracy can
create frequent leadership changes and may cause significant inefficiencies if
the cost of transitioning is high-especially when there is considerable
subjectivity and room for disagreement involved in evaluating "merit."264 In
comparison, ranking by seniority can be a more objective, simpler, and
therefore low-cost way of selecting leaders. But even so, this suggests that, at
most, kinship hierarchies may have had some redeeming qualities, and falls far
short of showing that they were consistently preferable to more meritocratic
selection.
Quite the opposite, the long-term socioeconomic consequences of
gerontocratic social ordering in late imperial China were very likely negative.
As argued above, its predominance helped create and sustain a set of property
institutions that were distinctly hostile to land accumulation by the economic
elite. Over time, this most probably led to lower agricultural productivity, but
more importantly, it cut off entrepreneurial families from a crucial source of
capital accumulation, and may very well have contributed to China's very slow
pace of industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.265
At a more micro level, there is evidence from South China that a
substantial minority of lineages that had amassed considerable common
property during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-property that was
owned by the lineage, rather than any specific household-became so
concerned about the negative financial consequences that non-meritocratic
governance generated that they eventually switched to a model where the
wealthiest households in the lineage were solely responsible for managing the
common property.266 Smallholders still retained a strong voice in other aspects
of lineage governance but apparently recognized their own limitations in
managing large estates.267 This suggests that the economic cost of ineffective
leadership was often high, which may explain why, in North China and the
Lower and Middle Yangtze, lineage ownership of common property was
actually very limited.
Given all this, the truly curious thing about Chinese kinship hierarchies
was, as noted in Part II, their uniformity and consistency across highly diverse
geographic, economic, and social terrain. During the late Ming, Qing, and
Republic, a period of some 500 years, they were the predominant
organizational principle almost everywhere, whether wheat-growing or ricegrowing, silk-producing or cotton-producing, mountainous or flat, humid or

263. This is true of all lineage regulations cited in supranote 261.
264. See Zhang, supra note 7.
265. See ZHANG, supra note 140, at 25-33.
266. ZHENG, supra note 248. The fact that traditional kinship hierarchies could be eroded by
economic concerns does not imply that economic forces were also responsible for their establishment.

267. Id.
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arid, densely populated or sparsely, interior or frontier.268 It is not terribly
difficult to imagine some economic or ecological scenario where kinship
hierarchies were a socioeconomically optimal institution, but that does nothing
to explain their near-universal appeal. A society-wide phenomenon deserves a
society-wide explanation, especially under these circumstances. As the
previous paragraphs show, the strongly non-meritocratic nature of kinship
hierarchies makes it extremely difficult to argue that they were almost always,
or perhaps even frequently, socioeconomically desirable.
If we limited our analytical timeframe to the late Qing and early
Republic, we could plausibly argue that the longevity of non-meritocratic
hierarchies derived simply from path-dependency or from institutional capture
by smallholders. But this argument clearly cannot apply to the Song and Yuan,
when extended kinship networks were still a relative novelty. In fact, for much
of the Song, Yuan, and early Ming, large numbers of smaller landowners and
tenants still lived under fairly feudal conditions of personal bondage to large
landlords,269 which suggests that their social clout and influence was probably
very limited. If lower-income households received most of their social status
from kinship hierarchies, then one has to question why wealthier households
would agree to such hierarchies in the first place, especially when they often
produced questionable leadership.
The two most plausible explanations, as discussed above, are political
incentives issued by the central government and widespread moral
internalization of related values. Either could have provided a sufficiently
powerful exogenous shock to generate normative uniformity across multiple
and highly diverse economic macroregions. But was it one of the two, or both?
2.

State Policy

The interaction between govermnent policy and the private establishment
of "Confucian" lineages during the Song, Ming and Qing is well-documented.
Throughout these dynasties, the central government maintained criminal codes
that, as discussed above, afford unequal legal status to senior and junior
relatives, and enforced basic norms of filial piety.270 For the most part, these
were straightforward continuations of earlier dynastic legal codes.271
Compared to earlier dynasties, however, the Song government and its
successors were increasingly willing to recognize the private establishment of
extended kinship hierarchies by officials who possessed no hereditary title and,
in later dynasties, by commoners. Pre-Song governments generally prohibited
the establishment of kinship networks beyond a very narrow circle of
hereditary nobility or high-level officials.272 Prior to the eleventh century, nonaristocratic officials and commoners were generally prohibited from engaging

268. See discussion surrounding supra note 259.
269.
270.

McDermott, supra note 133.
See discussion surrounding supranotes 226-230.

271. See Zhang, supra note 227, 113-35
272.

FENG ERKANG ET AL., supra note 212, at 93-163.
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in systemized ancestor worship beyond their father and grandfather. 273
Apparently, central authorities preferred that commoner family networks
remain small, unorganized, and without the kind of social authority that could
realistically obstruct government power.274
In 1041, however, the Song government tentatively allowed all
government officials, including those without any hereditary title, to engage in
systemized ancestor worship "according to ancient rituals." 275 This sent a clear
message that the government was interested in loosening the traditional
aristocratic monopoly over large-scale ancestor worship and extended kinship
hierarchies. By 1108, a clearer set of regulations had been issued, which
allowed all officials of the third rank or higher to worship five generations of
ancestors, officials of the eighth to fourth rank to worship three generations,
and all other officials and commoners to worship two generations-that is, the
patriarch's father and grandfather.276 The construction of ancestral worship
halls needed special permission from the emperor, and only a handful were
authorized throughout the Song. 277
This basic legal framework went largely unchanged for several centuries,
until the Ming.278 In 1384, following a series of petitions by local county

magistrates, all commoners received the right to worship three generations of
ancestors, which expanded their formally recognized kinship networks by
several times, while all officials, regardless of rank, could worship four-and
only four-generations.279 More radical change came in 1536, when the Ming
Court authorized all commoners and officials to worship up to five
generations. 280 Moreover, an unpublished internal document apparently
required all ranked officials to construct ancestral worship halls. 281
Commoners, on the other hand, were still formally forbidden from constructing
ancestral halls.
By the early Qing, the central government had gone from merely
permitting the formation of large commoner kinship networks to actively
promoting them. The Kangxi and Yongzheng emperors issued several edicts
273. Id. at 170-71.
274. Li & JIANG, supra note 231, at 27-32.
275. FENG ERKANG ET AL., supra note 212, at 170.
276. SONG SHI ((58) [THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE SONG], ch. 109 (Li Zhi no.
http://gj.zdic.net/archive.php?aid=7760.
277. FENG ETAL.,supra note 212,at 171.

12),

278. Id. at 171-72.
279. Chang Jianhua (#'Rif), Mingdai Zongzu Cimiao Jizu Lizhiji Qi Yanbian (lft&MMA
L$LMM fiff) [The Evolution ofAncestor Worship Practices in Ming Dynasty Lineages], 2001(3)
280. Xia Yan (]l),

[ACAD. J. OF NANKAI U.] 61.

Ling Chenmin De Ji Shizu Li Jiamiao Shu

(

NANKAI XUEBAO (Jff''R)

[A Petition Asking that All Subjects Be Allowed to Worship their Founding Ancestors], in GUIZHOU
WENJI (9)I110) [WRITINGS OF GUIZHOU], ch. 11 (1574, Microfilm, Peking University Library); ZHU
GUOZHEN (K IN t), HUANG MING DAZHENG 1 (4 ) i iji) [A COLLECTION OF RIGHTEOUS
WRITINGS IN AN ERA OF A BENEVOLENT EMPEROR], ch. 28-2 (Qilu Shushe ed., 1997). But see INOUE,
supra note 212, at 122-26, for skepticism on whether Xia Yan's proposal was really implemented by
official decree.
[OFFICIAL
281. JI HUANG ET AL. Ml[), QINDING XU WENXIAN TONGKAO (
SEQUEL TO THE EXEGESIS OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS], ch. 115 (1784, microfilm, Zhejiang Univ.

Library).
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that praised both the emergence of extended kinship networks and their close
adherence to "proper" Confucian norms of seniority and status.282 To further
incentivize the creation of extended kinship hierarchies, the Qing government
regularly granted symbolic economic favors to kinship networks that displayed
particularly "virtuous" behavior: "five generations living under one roof," for
example.283
At the same time, the government ramped up its legal efforts to recognize
and protect lineage corporate property. Embezzlement of lineage common
property was punishable by either temporary incarceration for minor offenses
284
Moreover, if a lineage leader
or permanent banishment for major ones.
committed a criminal offense, whatever economic penalty the government
imposed would not touch upon any common property he was managing. 285
Effectively, the lineage had acquired some degree of legal personhood.
The Qing government's unusual enthusiasm for private lineage formation
may have had something to do with its unique political circumstances. Being a
conquest dynasty, its Manchu rulers were keen to find ways of pacifying their
286
predominantly Han population.
Openly embracing "Confucian" virtues such
as filial piety was one potentially effective way of doing this. In addition, the
Qing also adopted an extremely laissez faire approach towards local
governance, keeping its bureaucratic apparatus at a very small size despite
rapid population growth.287 Encouraging the formation of self-regulating
kinship hierarchies may simply have been a way to compensate for the
government's own administrative limitations.
Given all this, is it plausible to argue that the widespread embracement of
Confucian kinship hierarchies by private kinship networks during the Second
Millennium was simply a direct response to legal or economic incentives
provided by the government? In short, probably not. First of all, the Song and
Ming governments never actively embraced the idea that commoners should be
forming their own extended kinship hierarchies. Rather, they seemed merely to
permit it-indeed rather grudgingly-and their regulatory efforts generally fell
far behind the actual proliferation of private ancestor worship in local social
life.
The Song government, as discussed above, never allowed lower-level
officials and commoners to worship more than two generations of ancestors

282. QINDING DAQING HUIDIAN SHILI (##)####-1W) [OFFICIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
DAQING HUIDIAN], ch. 397 (Shangwu Press ed., 1909). See Chang Jianhua (n'aS), Lun Shengyu

Guangxun yu Qingdai de Xiaozhi (iffif

ill/-# MitAlf&/) [On the Shengyu Guangxun and the Use

ofFilial Piety as a Governing Tool in the Qing], 1988(1) NANKAI SHIXUE (M3147
) [NANKAI UNIV.
HIST. STUD.] 35, for analysis.
283. FENG, supra note 230, at 52.
284. QINDING DAQING HULDIAN SHILI (t2
[OFFICIAL DAQ[NG HUIDIAN] (1909),
ch. 755.
285. FENG, supra note 230, at 54.
286. See WILLIAM T. ROWE, CHINA'S LAST EMPIRE: THE GREAT QING 11-62 (2009).
287. On the limited size and reach of the Qing bureaucracy, see CH'U, supra note 156; ELMAN,
supra note 256; REED, supra note 156; ROWE, supra note 286; and JOHN R. WATT, THE DISTRICT
MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1972). On examination degree quotas, see ELMAN, supra note
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and expressly forbade them from constructing ancestor worship halls. Local
documents indicate, however, that not only did large numbers of commoner
lineages worship far more than two generations of ancestors, but many, perhaps
most, of them had constructed private worship halls.288 This was increasingly
the case throughout the Song, Yuan, and early Ming.289 Thus, when the Ming
government finally allowed commoners to worship five generations of
ancestors in 1536, it was simply belatedly recognizing and legitimizing what
had long been an extremely common social practice.290
The Qing government was often more active in promoting private
establishment of kinship hierarchies, but was also prone to changes of heart. In
1726, it issued an edict stating that large local lineages should elect a zuzheng
who would wield government-recognized arbitration and policing powers and
could rely on local magistrates to help enforce his decisions.291 The rationale
seemed to be that this would allow the state to more effectively harness the
organizational capacities of local lineages. Within a few decades, however, it
had become abundantly clear that this formal delegation of power simply
emboldened lineages to further expand the scope of their self-governance, and
therefore weakened government control. In 1789, the Qianlong emperor
abolished the position entirely. 292
There are other reasons to doubt that state advocacy and encouragement
had much to do with the continued proliferation of kinship hierarchies during
the Qing. First and foremost, the government was, as discussed above, probably
not powerful enough to substantively intervene with communal and lineage
self-govemance.293 Perhaps reflecting the state's limited capacity, the material
incentives it offered to "virtuous" lineages were largely symbolic, conveying a
small amount of prestige, but no significant economic or political benefit. 294it
288. Examples are drawn from FENG ET AL., supra note 212, at 172-76.
289. LI & JIANG, supra note 231, at 35-71; INOUE, supra note 212, at 26-74.
290. It is not difficult to understand why the imperial government was often reluctant to extend
ancestor worship rights to commoners. People who have exclusive privileges are rarely eager to share
them with others. But perhaps more importantly, such extension amounted, effectively, to a conferral of
social authority and privilege from the central political elite to commoners, and would erode their
control over local affairs. The very compelling counterargument to all these concerns was, of course,
that state power in localities would shrink inevitably and, therefore, that the state might as well boost its
public legitimacy and popularity by granting extended worship rights. See INOUE, supra note 212, at
106-07, 123-24; HAMASHIMA ATSUTOSHI, MINDAI KOUNAN NOUSON SHIAKAI NO KENKYU [RESEARCH
Yuandai Muci Jizu
ON MING DYNASTY JIANGNAN RURAL SOCIETY] (1982); Chang Jianghua (
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Lineage and the Influence of the "Yimen"], 1994(2) ZHONGGUO SHI YANJIU (09
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MAOMING (&N
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291. 19 QINGCHAO WENXIAN TONGKAO (I 15RE4)
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS] 5031 (1988).
) [TRUE RECORDS OF THE QING] 1097, 1101 (1986).
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is hard to imagine them having more than a peripheral impact on the private
creation of kinship hierarchies. In fact, the social dominance of large kinship
networks was already very much secure by the early Qing, at least the Lower
Yangtze and North China. It was still a work-in-progress in the frontier regions
of Fujian or Guangdong, but the state's administrative capacity was even
weaker there than in core macroregions.295 Ultimately, it seems unlikely that
late imperial state activity really did much to directly stimulate the spread of
kinship hierarchies.
3.

Values and MoralInternalization

The previous two Subsections have argued that socioeconomic and
political incentives alone cannot satisfactorily explain the rapid proliferation of
large kinship hierarchies. The inadequacy of these functionalist or utilitarian
explanations suggests that kinship hierarchies were also sustained by some
form of moral internalization, wherein people justified seniority-based
inequality through moral reasoning, rather than through calculations of
socioeconomic welfare or political interest. To some extent, they had to think it
was "the right thing to do." The remainder of this Section provides "positive"
evidence that widespread moral internalization among the general population
had probably occurred as early as the Southern Song.
Basically, this relies on both the volume and uniformity of late imperial
private writings on kinship relations and ancestor worship. As many have
observed, there was an explosion, relative to immediately preceding eras, of
such writings in the Southern Song, and again in the Ming and Qing, and then
again in the early Republic.296 Virtually all of these writings speak of the basic
principle that senior relatives possessed higher social status than junior ones in
highly and exclusively moral terms.
As with most discussions of late imperial social morality, the major Song
Neo-Confucian scholar-officials-Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, and so onare a good place to start. Zhu Xi, in particular, zealously promoted the
establishment of large, private kinship networks organized according to
traditional Confucian seniority principles.297 His Northern Song predecessors
uniformly believed, despite their otherwise deep and sometimes irreconcilable
philosophical differences, that zun gaonian ("privileging elders") was a
fundamental principle of human morality.298 Indeed, virtually all major Song
295. See FAURE, supra note 248; SUSAN MANN, LOCAL MERCHANTS AND THE CHINESE
BUREAUCRACY, 1750-1950 (1987); ROBERT MARKS, TIGERS, RICE, SILK, AND SILT: ENVIRONMENT AND
ECONOMY IN LATE IMPERIAL SOUTH CHINA 226-48 (2006.).
296. See, e.g., FENG ET AL., supra note 212, at 195-208; LI & JIANG, supra note 231, at 32-35;
BOSSLER, supra note 255 (focusing on the proliferation of eulogies in the Song); FEI CHENGKANG ET
AL. (RAMT), ZHONGGUO DE JIAFA ZUGUI (90'J3MAR) [FAMILY AND CLAN REGULATIONS IN

CHINA] 14-25 (1998); XU (1992); ZHU (1987).
297.

ZHU XI (A),

JIALI (iei)

[FAMILY RITUALS] (Wang Yanjun & Wang Guangzhao eds.,

1999).
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298. ZHANG ZAI 11 (i
) [COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ZHANG ZAI] 258-59 (Zhonghua Shuju
ed., 1978); 2 ER CHENG JI (__&A) [COLLECTED WRITINGS OF CHENG HAO AND CHENG YI] 350-52
(Zhonghua Shuju ed., 1981); Qiu Hansheng (14229), Songmin Lixue yu Zongfa Sixiang (VFq'-f
) [Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism and Lineage Rituals and Thought], 1979(11) LISHI YANJIU
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statesmen who left some written record at some point found it necessary or
desirable to morally endorse extended kinship networks organized according to
Confucian hierarchies and principles.299
If we descend into the much more diverse world of non-academic private
writings-for example, personal eulogies and lineage registries-the largely
unconditional acceptance of kinship hierarchies continues to be a basic
theme.300 The style and narrative focus of eulogies and registries changed
considerably from the Tang to the Song, and underwent further changes during
the Song, but the praising of individuals for filial obedience to elder relatives
remained consistent. 30 1
The observations drawn above could basically be made of any late
imperial dynasty. Ming and Qing scholars almost uniformly shared the basic
conviction that inequality and some measure of sociopolitical dominance
between senior and junior relatives was simply the natural order of things. For
all their philosophical differences, Wang Yangming echoed Zhu Xi very
closely when he wrote that "the different statuses of senior and junior relatives"
had been a fundamental and self-evident natural principle since the age of Yao
and Shun.302 Even scholars who expressly challenged the Neo-Confucian
mainstream generally embraced these basic renlun ("human principles"): Gu
Yanwu, Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi during the Ming-Qing transition, and
any number of "Hanxue" advocates during the Qing. 303 The famed contrarian
intellectual Li Zhi, who relentlessly accused most Neo-Confucian scholars of
being thorough "fakes," 304 nonetheless endorsed filial piety as a desirable
moral principle.305 In fact, it really was not until the early twentieth century
(59iT?}f5) [HIST. STUD.] 63.
299. On Fan Zhongyan (MOAIi), see Bian Guofeng (TM)K), Fan Zhongyan Zongzu Fuli
M)) IA Study on Fan Zhongyan's Thoughts on Lineage
1J
li'
Sixiang Yanjiu ([{
), see Shi Yingying (;
Welfare] (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Jilin Univ., 2004). On Wang Anshi (1
OR
Eilb NAi [On Wang
WW), Wang Anshi Jingxin yu Jingshi Sixiang Lunshu (1
Anshi's Ideology of "Heart-Cultivation" and "Social Cultivation"] (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Pengjia
Univ., 2011). On Sima Guang (714'), see Ma Jialu (-/11188), Sima Guang Shehui Sixiang Tanxi (M]
) [An Exploration of Sima Guang's Social Thought] (unpublished M.A. Thesis,
Qingdao Univ., 2009).
300. See sources cited at supra note 296.
301. Buddhism and Daoism did, of course, compete with Confucianism, sometimes violently,
for political and social influence during much of the first millennium, but by the Song they had largely
retreated from the realm of high politics, and sought out a more peaceful coexistent in local religious and
cultural life. See RICHARD VON GLAHN, THE SINISTER WAY: THE DIVINE AND THE DEMONIC IN
CHINESE RELIGIOUS CULTURE (2004); JACQUES GERNET, BUDDHISM IN CHINESE SOCIETY: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY FROM THE FIFTH TO THE TENTH CENTURIES (Franciscus Verellen trans., 1995);
BAREND TER HAAR, THE WHITE LOTUS TEACHINGS IN CHINESE RELIGIOUS HISTORY 16-63 (1992);
VALERIE HANSEN, CHANGING GODS IN MEDIEVAL CHINA, 1127-1276 (1990).
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that serious skepticism towards kinship hierarchies began to emerge among the
306
but by then kinship hierarchies were so deeply entrenched
intellectual elite,
in Chinese society that such skepticism had very little rural social effect until
the Communist era.307

Throughout these dynasties, an increasing number of kinship networks
began compiling genealogies and internal regulations, which were natural
venues for philosophical and moral discussion on social hierarchies. 308 These
writings routinely declared that ranking kinship members by generation and age
was a form of natural law that reached back into the distant past. 309 An early
Ming genealogy claimed that traditional Confucian hierarchies were tianlun
("heavenly moral principles") and that those who violated them "would be
annihilated by the heavens, and abandoned by men." 310 Similar language was
epidemic in Yuan, Ming and Qing genealogies.
As discussed at the end of Part II, one can further separate the process of
moral or cultural internalization into the internalization of a norm itself and the
internalization, independent of any material or political benefits, of the desire to
"behave like the perceived sociopolitical elite." It may be logically useful to
consider whether the latter alone can explain the historical account presented
above without the former occurring on a large scale. The answer is probably
no: one very rarely finds any substantial language to this effect in the myriad of
moral or intellectual writings surveyed above. Gerontocratic hierarchies are
almost always justified through appeal to their innate justness and moral
necessity, rather than to their practice by elite families. One would imagine
that, if imitation was the primary motivation, there would be a much greater
volume of local writing that attempted to identify the similarities between local
kinship hierarchies and contemporary elite social practice.
This is not to deny that elite social practice played an important role in the
initial creation and proliferation of kinship hierarchies. As David Faure and
others have argued, in South China, "lineage institutions spread only as
government ideology permeated village society." 311 Local communities
looked, first and foremost, to state and elite practice to determine what was
proper and right, but this was a process of education, persuasion, and setting
"moral examples," not unconditional imitation. Within a few generations, the
moral examples set by political elites came to acquire widespread normative
Chuantong Sixiang (

[The Traditional Thought of the "Heretic" Li Zhi],
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1990
[Between
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authority of their own and could sustain themselves with or without the
continuous existence of contemporary elite examples.
C. A Note on English and Japanese SocialHierarchies
If Chinese kinship hierarchies were "cultural," could the same be said of
England and Japan? There is, unfortunately, no clear answer to this question.
The primary argument in favor of widespread cultural internalization in
China-the formidable uniformity of non-meritocratic kinship hierarchies
across diverse ecological and economic conditions-is inapplicable to England
and Japan. England is far smaller than either China or Japan. Correspondingly,
one finds far less economic and ecological diversity in rural England, which
makes it much easier to accept bottom-up utilitarian narratives of norm
formation.
Japan is much larger and more ecologically diverse, but its property
institutions and social hierarchies are also considerably less uniform than their
Chinese or English counterparts. Its customary mortgage redemption deadlines
ranged from less than two years to a decade, and in a few cases to perpetuity.312
In addition, the representation of smallholders among the village political elite
varied from village to village. The tension between hereditary status and
wealth-based status itself probably caused much normative variation and
fluctuation between and within Japanese villages.
Moreover, the "non-meritocratic" accusation is much easier to lodge at
hierarchies based on seniority than at those based on wealth. Making status
dependent on wealth incentivizes wealth maximization and productivity
growth. It also tends to place the most economically capable members of the
community in leadership positions, which would intuitively benefit economic
development. In other words, wealth-based hierarchies, like other meritocratic
hierarchies, are arguably more desirable from a utilitarian perspective than
seniority-based ones.
Despite all this, there is nonetheless some evidence to suggest, if
extremely tentatively, that English and Japanese social hierarchies did indeed
possess a fair amount of moral authority. The English notion that status should
depend upon landed wealth was generally discussed in highly moralistic
terms-for example, the landed gentry were sometimes referred to as "those
whome their race and blood or at least their vertues doo make noble and
knowne"-that suggested at least some degree of internalization. 313 Likewise,
Japanese villagers sometimes spoke of their status hierarchies in somewhat
reverent terms, claiming that they stemmed from titles granted in "the ancient
past." 314 Whether these quotes are accurate reflections of deeper underlying
sociocultural currents is an issue for another day. The Article's theoretical
claim was, as the reader will recall, that cultural factors could shape property
institutions, not that they always and necessarily did so. One society out of
312. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
313. WRIGHTSON supra note 16 at 27.
314. oOMs, supra note 17, at 214.
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three will suffice, for now.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that a cultural theory of property is necessary to
understand some major divergences between early modem Chinese, English,
and Japanese property institutions-that, essentially, there were "cultural
paradigms" in the property institutions of these societies. It has demonstrated a
chain of causation, at least in the Chinese case, from culturally internalized
norms of status allocation to actual distributions of sociopolitical status, to the
property institutions that emerged from bargaining between social groups of
varying sociopolitical stature. By doing so, the Article argues that cultural
factors can substantively shape and influence property institutions, even if
people generally approach property regulation per se from a self-interested and
utilitarian perspective. The failure to recognize this is, indeed, one of
contemporary property theory's major blind spots.
Beyond these general arguments, the historical narrative also illustrates
several finer theoretical points made in Part II. First, the persistent and
powerful rich-poor tensions that drove mortgage regulation provide yet another
example of how property institutions are often deeply political and divisive.
There was very little collective thinking about "general social welfare." Instead,
there was hard-nosed bargaining based on foreseeable economic self-interest.
In addition, there were clear winners and losers in the bargaining process-just
not always the winners and losers that a modem observer would intuitively
expect.
Second, the formation of Chinese dian customs vividly illustrates the
often fundamentally different ways in which individuals approach property
institutions and status hierarchies. The former was a decidedly utilitarian affair,
whereas the latter was deeply moral, even religious. There is little reason to
assume that the same behavioral assumptions about self-interest or moral
internalization must apply equally to all human institutions. Unfortunately, the
historical evidence produced here does not really permit a deeper inquiry into
why status hierarchies were morally internalized, at least in China, whereas
property institutions, whether Chinese, English, or Japanese, were apparently
not. The psychological theories of childhood norm internalization discussed in
Part II are highly plausible, but difficult to verify in a historical context.
Third, the historical narrative presented here is actually highly compatible
with conventional law and economics. Cultural factors only enter the narrative
at the status hierarchy stage, by which point it becomes conceptually possible
to subsume them within individual utility functions. This is a distinctly
individualist account of cultural influence: "cultural factors" are not "operative
engines" that act upon human society in a consolidated fashion but are, instead,
influential only because individuals have internalized them. This
methodological individualism is, in all likelihood, why Greif and other
institutional economists have favored an internalization-based definition of
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culture over the more expansive definitions espoused by anthropologists. 315 As
Ellickson pointed out, speaking broadly of "culture" without a coherent theory
of its individual application is incompatible with the otherwise individualist
analysis favored by law and economics.316 This Article has attempted to
provide both such a theory and historical evidence to support it.
The remainder of the conclusion considers how we might apply and test
the general theoretical claim that culture influences property institutions in
post-industrial, modem societies and what its broader implications might be.
The pre-industrial empirical setting of this Article conveys a number of very
obvious advantages: most importantly, it avoids the massive wave of
governmental expansion that accompanied large-scale industrialization in all
three countries. In the Japanese and Chinese contexts, governmental expansion
also went hand-in-hand with the attempted implementation of Westerninfluenced legal codes-German for Japan, Soviet for China-that aimed to
"modemize" or "revolutionize" traditional law and custom, including most
areas of property law. 317 The great expansion of state authority gave these legal
transplants some actual teeth, unlike the oft-ignored, usually-circumvented
legal codes of earlier eras.318 In other words, actual legal practice becomes
much harder to observe once large-scale industrialization kicks in: it becomes
subsumed under new, stronger, and linguistically foreign layers of legal
authority. The relative simplicity and clarity of village commercial customs
created through communal self-regulation no longer existed.
Nonetheless, the pre-industrial setting of this Article is merely
empirically convenient, rather than theoretically necessary. There is no obvious
reason to assume that culture matters less in contemporary societies, only that it
is made more fluid and complex. Status hierarchies clearly continue to exist in
virtually all human societies, and continue to vary, at least nominally, from
319
It also seems quite plausible that they continue to exert
country to country.
serious influence on property institutions. In other words, the basic theoretical
moves made in this Article are by no means logically specific to early modem
societies.
Some social and political theorists, particularly those writing in the postCold War decade, have suggested that a number of "modem" social forcesglobalization, the internet, or perhaps the ideological dominance of liberal
democracies-will eventually render "cultural" differences between societies
nonexistent.320 Such arguments have lost, however, much of their intellectual

315.
316.
317.

See sources cited supra notes 87-90
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 542.
See discussion surrounding supro notes 28-29.

318. Id.
319. For international surveys, see Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have
an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997), supra note 113; and
Licht et al., supra note 58.
320. The most (in)famous of these statements is probably FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF
HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). See also MARWAN KRAIDY, HYBRIDITY, OR THE CULTURAL
LOGIC OF GLOBALIZATION 1-23 (2005); JOHN TOMLINSON, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE (1999).
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appeal in recent years. 32 1 In particular, the apparent ability of many East Asian
economies to rapidly "modernize" their economy while retaining apparently
distinct cultural, ideological, and political identities gives the "cultural
question" examined here a strong claim to contemporary relevance.322 For the
specific purposes of this Article, which only seeks to make a baseline
theoretical argument, it suffices to pick the low-hanging, pre-industrial fruit
first, but this is obviously inadequate as a long-term strategy.
There are a number of ways to deal with the heightened sociolegal
complexity brought along by modem state-building and legal transplanting.
The obvious one is to look at the margins of government authority, at places
where grassroots or local social forces remain strong enough to substantively
curb state authority, and where the influence of "traditional culture" is probably
strongest, and easiest to discern. Most often, this will be in rural areas. There is,
for example, a growing academic literature on whether traditional kinship
structures affect rural Chinese political and legal institutions.323 At least one
such study has found that the existence of large, well-organized kinship
networks in contemporary Chinese villages tend to deter against government
land expropriation. 324
Of course, there is a considerable gap between these findings and the
claim that "cultural factors" affected these institutional outcomes. As discussed
in Part IV, kinship networks themselves are not necessarily cultural
constructs-very often, they are simply pragmatic responses to socioeconomic
challenges. What was distinctly "cultural" about traditional kinship networks
were the status hierarchies they enforced. It remains to be seen whether these
status hierarchies continue to play a significant role in the sociopolitical
operation of contemporary kinship networks.
"Margins of state authority" also exist even where the government's
general legal and political authority is strong and largely unchallenged: as
Lawrence Lessig, commenting on the advent of social norms theory in law and
economics during the 1990s, once argued, one does not have to look at remote

321. See, e.g., ALAN RUGMAN, THE END OF GLOBALIZATION (2012); JAN AARTE SCHOLTE,
GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 159-223 (2d ed. 2005); Christian Collet & Takashi
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Assumptions among the Publics of GreaterAsia and the Pacific, 13 JAP. J. POL. SC. 553 (2012); Robert
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Soc'Y. 273 (2002); Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Islamic Culture and Democracy. Testing the
Clash of Civilizations' Thesis, 12 COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY 235 (2002). One result of such skepticism
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322. This has led, in fact, to arguments that the social influence of Confucianism in East Asian
societies has driven their economic rise. See, e.g., MICHIO MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN
"SUCCEEDED"?: WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS (1982); Ming-Yih Liang,
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localities and under-regulated "frontiers" to appreciate the existence of social
325
Under what
norms that shape how legal institutions are applied in real life.
circumstances, for example, will an average urban property owner initiate
litigation against, rather than informally settle with, a trespasser? Are there
cultural undertones, however remote, to her pattern of decision making?
It is not terribly difficult to imagine how a cultural examination of state
legislation, rulemaking, or adjudication might proceed. A growing number of
property scholars now apply political economy analysis to property regulation,
ranging from the initial allocation of property rights to use regulations such as
zoning.326 From there, it is but a small step to studying the influence of status
hierarchies or other potentially cultural social norms on political preferences
and power. Similarly, studies of judicial behavior now regularly portray judges
327
This, too, easily
as either political or self-interested, and often both.
facilitates further inquiries into the (potentially cultural) origins of their
political leanings, or into the content of their perceived self-interest.
Ultimately, there are several promising empirical strategies one can
employ to handle the challenges posed by large-scale legal transplanting in
contemporary societies. One could argue, in fact, that such transplanting is
precisely what gives cultural analysis its normative significance in many
contemporary societies. Given the tremendous amount of West-to-East legal
transplanting of property law in the past century, a coherent account of how
legal transplants are "localized" is essential to understanding and evaluating
their transitional costs and eventual consequences. This Article demonstrates
that, at the very least, these accounts should seriously consider the possible
influence of local cultural factors on property use and regulation. 328

325. Lawrence Lessig, The New ChicagoSchool, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998).
326. E.g., Adesoji 0. Adelaja & Paul D. Gottlieb, The Political Economy of Downzoning, 38
AGRI. RESOURCE ECON. REV. 181 (2009); Been et al., supra note 49; Stephen Calabrese et al., On The
PoliticalEconomy of Zoning, 91 J. PUB. ECoN. 25 (2007); Schleicher, supra note 49; Raquel Fernandez
& Richard Rogerson, Zoning and the PoliticalEconomy ofLocal Redistribution(Nat'l. Bureau of Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 4456, 1993).
327. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., JACK KNIGHT & LEE EPSTEIN, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE (1997); Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827; Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious

Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000); Mitu Gulati, Stephen Choi & Eric
Posner, Judicial Ability and Securities Class Actions (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper (2d
Series) No. 519, 2010); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship.
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism (Cornell Law Faculty Publ'ns Paper 733, 2002),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/733.
328. Although this Article has focused on the connection between cultural norms and property
institutions, there is very little in its theoretical framework that cannot be applied to other kinds of legal
institutions. There is, in fact, a growing and more general "law and culture" literature, which has thus far
been largely uninvolved with property theory. See, e.g., Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law
and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43 (2011); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence,

Norms, and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003); Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 357 (2007); Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV.

511 (2009); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study ofLaw: Taking on the Technicalities,
53 BUFFALO L. REV. 973 (2005).

